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THE IMPACT OF THE FCC'S CHAIN BROADCASTING
RULES
TEN years ago the Federal Communications Commission issued its Chain
Broadcasting Rules.1 These Rules were designed to curb the growing power
of the networks and to eliminate specific restraints embodied in contracts
between the networks and their member stations. In promulgating the
Rules, the Commission was walking a tightrope. On the one hand, it wanted
to give the networks enough control over affiliates to assure advertisers of
simultaneous nationwide coverage. 2 At the same time, it sought to promote
competition among stations and among networks,3 and to increase the re-
1. The issuance of the Rules on May 2, 1941 was accompanied by an exhaustive re-
port marshalling evidence adduced by the Commission during three years of investigation
and explaining the aims of the eight regulations. FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING,
Docket No. 5060 (hereafter cited as CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT). On October 11, 1941,
the Commission amended three of the regulations in order to clarify them or to lighten their
burden on the networks. At the same time the effective date of a fourth was postponed in-
definitely. FCC, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING (1941); 6 JOURNAL OF
THE FEDERAL COMnrUNICATIONs BAR ASSOCIATION 36 (1941). See notes 30, 31 infra.
In October, 1941, CBS and NBC brought suits under § 402(a) of the Communications
Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-5, 201-22, 301-29, 401-16,
501-6, 601-9 (1946) (hereafter cited as COMMsUNICATIONs ACT), to enjoin enforcement of
the Regulations. The district court dismissed the suits for want of jurisdiction but granted
a stay of the Rules pending appeal to the Supreme Court. Columbia Broadcasting System
v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 688 (S.D. N.Y. 1942). On appeal the Supreme Court held that
the suits could be maintained under § 402(a), remanded them to the district court, and con-
tinued the stay. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942),
noted in 56 HARV. L. REv. 121, 21 N.C.L. REv. 68, 10 U. of CHI. L. REV. 88. On remand the
district court granted the government's motions for summary judgment and dismissed the
suits on the merits. In February, 1943, the Supreme Court affirmed and the Rules became
fully effective. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1942); 41 MICH.
L. REv. 316.
2. "This report is based upon the premise that the network system plays a vital role
in radio broadcasting and has brought great benefits to it. We have carefully drawn our
regulations so as not to interfere with any of the three major functions which a network
performs-the sale of time to advertisers; the production of programs, both commercial and
sustaining; and the distribution of programs to stations." CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 77.
3. "A constantly improving service to the public requires that all the competitive
elements within the industry should be preserved. The door of opportunity must be kept
open for new networks. Competition among networks, among stations, and between sta-
tions and networks, . . . must be set free from artificial restraints." Id. at 50.
The Communications Act does not specifically authorize the FCC to regulate competition
in the radio industry and the legislative history is at best equivocal. WARNER, RADIO AND
TELEVISION LAW 483-94 (1948). But Congress did include elaborate provisions on the
subject of monopoly, which demonstrate that it relied upon the interplay of free competitive
forces to assure utilization of radio in the public interest. E.g., persons engaged in radio
broadcasting shall not be deemed a common carrier (§ 153(h); the antitrust laws apply to
radio (§ 313); FCC is authorized to refuse a license to any applicant who has been found
guilty of violation of antitrust laws in radio communications (§ 311); free competition in
commerce is to be preserved (§ 314). The Supreme Court has consistently supported the
view that preservation of competition was one of the objectives of Congress and has upheld
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sponsibility of the individual licensee.
4
The impact of the Rules on the industry has been slight. Although the
formal contracts between networks and their affiliates have changed con-
siderably in the past decade, the actual relationship between them is very
much the same as before. Yet the FCC has done little to enforce the Rules.
It has made but one thorough investigation of a network; and in that in-
stance, after finding extensive violations, it refused to invoke any sanctions.,
All in all, the Rules have not made network practices since 1941 substantially
different from their practices before that date.
NETWORK BROADCASTING BEFORE THE RULES
Network broadcasting was developed to permit exploitation of the lucra-
tive national advertising market and wide dissemination of cultural and
"national issue" programs. A central traffic agent was needed to line up
key stations throughout the country and to reserve popular listening hours
for nation-wide programs. As pioneers in this development, NBC with two
the Commission's efforts in this behalf. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 223-4 (1943); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474-5 (1940);
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1946).
4. "It is the station, not the network, which is licensed to serve the public interest.
The licensee has the duty of determining what programs shall be broadcast over his station's
facilities, and cannot lawfully delegate this duty or transfer the control of his station directly
to the network or indirectly to an advertising agency. . . . The licensee is obliged to reserve
to himself the final decision as to what programs will best serve the public interest." CHAIN
BROADCASTING REPORT 66.
In order to aid the Commission in selecting responsible operators, Congress requires
that "fa]ll . . . applications shall set forth such facts as the Commission by regulation may
prescribe as to the citizenship, character, and financial, technical, and other qualifications
of the applicant to operate the station. . . ." Communications Act § 308(b). Similarly a
station license may not be transferred without the Commission's permission. Communica-
tions Act § 310(b). The Commission has consistently held that a licensee may not delegate
control over programming or business operations. The Yankee Network Inc., 5 PIKE &
FISCHER RADIO REG. 216 (1949); Georgia School of Technology, 10 F.C.C. 110 (1943);
cf. Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (Commission's reasoning
upheld, but court recommended leniency for the offender). This principle has been codified
in a Commission regulation. 47 CODE FED. REGs. § 3.109 (1949).
The Cbmmission hoped that by augmenting station control overprogram content and by
increasing the number of network companies, the Rules would promote freedom of speech
in radio and the fair presentation of controversial public issues. Hearings before Committee
on Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 113, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1941) (hereafter cited as
Hearings on S. Res. 113).
5. Don Lee Broadcasting System, 5 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 1179 (1949). See
pages 96-8, 104 infra.
6. There is some controversy as to whether chain broadcasting received its first
impetus from the demands of advertisers for wide coverage or from the pressure of local
audiences seeking service from New York. ROBINSON, RADIO NETWORKS AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERN MENT 18 (1943). In any event, since 1923, when A.T. & T. first connected two sta-
tions for simultaneous broadcasting, the network system has been the keystone of American
radio. On the early history of radio and the networks, see, WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO
(1947); ARCHER, BIG BUSINESS AND RADIO (1939) and HISTORY OF RADIO TO 1926 (1938).
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networks and CBS with one, rapidly attained a position of dominance)
Mutual entered the scene in the mid-thirties, but, in terms of coverage and
revenue, was of relatively minor importance." By 1938 national networks
accounted for 62% of the full-time stations, 97.9% of the nighttime wattage,
and 50% of the revenues of the radio industry.' Each network owned or
leased a few key stations in large cities, but most network outlets were in-
dependently owned stations linked to the network by means of affiliation
contracts.10
Prior to the issuance of the Network Rules, the affiliation contracts con-
tained highly restrictive provisions.1 The heart of the contract was an ex-
clusive option clause. Under this provision the most desirable portions of the
broadcasting day were designated "option time." 12 The network could re-
7. In 1938 NBC and CBS together accounted for 50 out of a total of 52 of the most
powerful "clear channel" stations and 146 out of 305 regional, unlimited time stations. By
and large, only the small 2 50-watt outlets were left for other networks or for independent
operation. CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 31. Of a total of $100,892,259 proceeds from time
sales received by the broadcasting industry in 1938, sales of network time by NBC and CBS
amounted to $44,313,778, and stations which they owned collected an additional $6,734,772.
Id. at 32. Furthermore, the operations of these two chains were not limited to the produc-
tion and distribution of programs. Both engaged extensively in the management of radio
artists whom they tied to exclusive contracts. NBC further insisted that all transcriptions
of its programs be made by its parent company RCA despite contrary wishes of sponsors.
Id. at 9-25, 30-34; ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 208-19.
8. Although in number of affiliates Mutual by 1940 had surpassed Columbia and was
not far behind National, its impressive total of 170 member stations was misleading. In
fact, Mutual's coverage was very spotty and missed many important markets. Most of its
affiliates were stations of 250 watts or less. It had but one Class I-A clear-channel station,
with no sky wave interference, WGN of Chicago, and one Class I-B clear-channel station,
WOR of New York, which shared its frequency with another Class I-B station. In 1938
the net profits of each of the other two networks exceeded Mutual's gross revenue from
time sales. Hearings on S. Res. 113, 167.
9. CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 31,32.
10. NBC was the owner of ten stations and CBS of eight, while affiliates totaled 214
and 121 stations respectively. The importance of the owned stations should not, however,
be discounted, for they included 14 out of 30 of the highest power, clear channel stations
in the country. Id. at 30, 32. Located exclusively in the richest metropolitan markets.
networks-owned stations not only provide convenient studios for production of chain
programs but also are the chief sources of revenue for the networks. Hearings before Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce on S.1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1947).
Mutual has always been organized in a different manner. It owns no stations but rather
is itself owned by certain of its affiliates. In 1940 the 100 shares of Mutual stock were dis-
tributed as follows: 25, WOR; 25, WGN; 25, Don Lee Network; 6, Colonial Network; 6,
United Broadcasting Co.; 6, Cincinnati Times-Star Co.; 6, Western Ontario Broadcasting
Co., Ltd.; 1, Fred Weber (qualifying share). CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 28; see Com-
ment, FCC Regulation of Competition among Networks, 51 Y.uL L.J. 448 (1942).
11. For copies of the affiliation contracts of all three networks, see Hearings on S. Res.
113, 107-126.
12. NBC typically reserved the following time:
Weekdays Sundays
10:00 a.m.-12:00 noon 1:00-4:00 p.m.
3:00 p.m.-6:00 p.m. 5:00-6:00 p.m.
7:00 p.m.-7:30 p.m. 7:00-11:00 p.m.
8:00 p.m.-11:00 p.m.
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quire its affiliates, on 28 days' notice, to "clear" option time of any local
programs previously scheduled and to substitute the network's commercial
program. 13 The station owner 14 theoretically retained the power to reject
any network program not in the public interest. But NBC required that he
affirmatively justify his rejection," and CBS insisted that he give the net-
work notice of rejection three weeks before the scheduled date of the pro-
gram.' 6 An "affiliation exclusivity" clause prevented member stations from
carrying programs of competing networks even during unoptioned time.
17
In return, the network granted "territorial exclusivity," promising not to
supply programs to any rival station within an affiliate's primary service
area-even programs rejected by the affiliate." The chains generally con-
trolled station rates for sale of time to network advertisers," and NBC
further retained the power to penalize an affiliate whenever its independent
national advertising rates varied from those established for network sales. 2
CBS, on the other hand, did not limit itself to specified hours, but reserved the power to
demand clearance for any broadcasting hours desired. Thus Columbia affiliates were even
more restricted than those of NBC. A proviso limiting Columbia's demands to a total of
50 "converted hours," or an average of 79 clock hours per week had no practical effect, as
no CBS affiliated station had ever carried this many network programs. CHAIN BROAD-
CASTING REPORT 37 n. 21, 64 n. 24.
Mutual had no time option provisions until 1940, and then the option power applied
only to its seven stockholders, and expressly provided for termination upon FCC dis-
approval. Furthermore, option time was limited to 3j'2 to 43/2 specified hours on week days
and 6 hours on Sundays.
For exact terms of option clauses, see Hearings on S. Res. 113, 109, 113, 115, 118.
13. Ibid.
14. In this comment the terms "station owner" and "outlet" are used interchangeably
with the term "licensee."
15. "[M]ost NBC and CBS affiliates are required to take network commercial programs
unless such programs are not in the public interest. NBC even goes so far as to require that
the licensee 'be able to support his contention that what he has done has been more in the
public interest than had he carried on the network program.' Thus the burden of proof is
placed upon the licensee." CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 65, 66.
16. See the text of the CBS contract in Hearings on S. Res. 113, 113.
17. Id. at 112, 114, 122.
18. Columbia and Mutual expressly incorporated this guarantee of exclusive service
in their contracts. Id. at 113, 122. National, on the other hand, refused the protection of
territorial exclusivity to all but a few key affiliates, granting it to them only after a "knock
down and drag out fight." CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 58. In practice, however, NBC
rarely supplied competing stations with network programs. Ibid.
19. In the case of NBC and CBS, station rates for network advertisers were set forth
in the affiliation contracts or in the networks' "rate cards." Affiliates of these networks
could not change their rates during the five year term of the contracts. But NBC retained
the power to decrease an outlet's rate on one year's notice, although the station could usually
choose to disaffiliate if the proposed reduction were too onerous. While the standard CBS
contract was silent on this point, in some cases Columbia also retained the power to change
station rates. Mutual affiliates on the other hand, set their own rates and were free to change
them at any time. Hearings on S. Res. 113, 110; CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 43-4.
20. Hearings on S. Res. 113, 111; ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 135-40. This
power worked both ways. If an affiliate offered national advertisers a rate more favorable for
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The affiliation contracts were usually binding for five years on member sta-
tions, but could be terminated by the networks on one or two years' notice.21-
The effect of these provisions was to restrict competition between stations
and between networks and to make the individual station owner a less
responsible operator in the public interest. The territorial exclusivity clause
foreclosed independent stations from a large part of the national advertising
market and denied them access to popular network programs.2 2 The net-
work option clause restricted affiliates' ability to enter into binding commit-
ments with advertisers for sponsorship of local programs and national non-
network, or "spot," programs. 23 In the case of NBC stations, the threat of
being penalized for any variance between network and non-network rates
further discouraged affiliates from independent solicitation of national ad-
vertising. The contracts were equally effective in hindering the growth of
new chains. The affiliation exclusivity clause barred new networks from
purchasing time during popular broadcasting hours on stations affiliated
with National and Columbia,2 4 and the five-year contract term made it well
spot (non-network) programs than the one established by the network, NBC could lower the
rate for network commercials to equal the spot rate without giving the outlet the opportu-
nity to disaffiliate. On the other hand, if an affiliate substituted a more profitable local or
spot program for one offered by the network, NBC could claim as "liquidated damages"
the amount by which the money received from broadcasting the substituted program ex-
ceeded the compensation set for the rejected network program. In practice NBC rarely if
ever invoked these provisions, but the threat was an effective deterrent to affiliates who
might wish to profit by a flexible rate schedule.
21. This was true of only NBC and CBS contracts. Mutual's contracts with its stock-
holding stations were binding on the network for five years, whereas the affiliate could sever
connections on one year's notice at any time after the first two years. The remaining Mutual
affiliation contracts bound both parties for only one year. CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 35.
22. Hence profitable operation was often contingent upon a station's joining a net-
work. In 1938 the 310 stations not affiliated with any national network had a consolidated
loss of about $149,000, while the 350 national affiliates together showed a profit of about
$15,000,000. CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 48 n. 10. Comparison here might be mislead-
ing, however, unless one realizes that independent stations were, for the most part, lower
powered and relatively less firmly established than network members.
Another unfortunate consequence of territorial exclusivity was that audiences were
deprived of network programs rejected by a local affiliate despite the willingness of another
station to carry them. For example, when Mutual outlets in Buffalo rejected a sustaining
program series known as "The American Forum of the Air," an independent station, WBNY,
was unable to broadcast the programs, and the Buffalo audience had no opportunity to
listen to this worthwhile series. Id. at 58.
23. The NBC vice-president in charge of sales testified in the Chain Broadcasting hear-
ings that by and large 13 weeks is the minimum time necessary for an advertising campaign
to take hold. Id. at 63. Under these conditions a non-network advertiser would certainly
be wary of sponsoring a program series to be broadcast during option time and thereby sub-
ject to displacement on only four weeks' notice.
24. Although Mutual was permitted to contract with 25 NBC and 5 CBS stations of
low power, this was of minimal value to Mutual because its programs on these stations
could be ousted by National or Columbia on 28 days' notice. Mutual's general manager
testified that this disability resulted in the loss of potential advertising revenue. Ibid.
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nigh impossible to wean stations away from these established networks.
21
Mutual, for example, had great difficulty attracting advertisers because. of
its inability to place its programs on the powerful outlets.26 And when a
fifth network threatened to enter the field in 1939, Mutual in turn adopted
the same restrictive provisions.27 The affiliation contracts further hampered
a station licensee in building up a balanced program schedule and in develop-
ing local live programs. 2 The option clause forced him to abdicate control
over much of the broadcasting day to the network or to its advertisers. And
in practice his technical right to reject undesirable programs was often
limited by inability to ascertain in advance the precise content of programs
offered by the network.
2 9
25. National and Columbia attempted to justify the exclusivity clause as necessary to
prevent confusion for the listening public accustomed to finding only NBC or CBS programs
on a particular station. But such confusion, if it did result, would be short-lived, ending as
soon as listeners became accustomed to dual affiliation. Similarly the networks argued that
the five year term of affiliation contracts were necessary for stable network operations to
protect the investment of chain and outlet alike. But their actions belied their words, for
stability was not important enough to induce the networks similarly to bind themselves.
In more candid moments network officials admitted that these provisions were included
specifically to check the competitive challenge of new networks. The older networks ap-
parently felt that they deserved a kind of protective status because of their pioneering efforts.
Id. at 46-50; ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 140-58. But the Communications Act con-
fers upon licensees no vested right to continuous operation, § 309(b), and network organiza-
tions can claim no rights superior to those of the stations of which they are composed.
26. CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 52, 63. Furthermore, wherever Mutual was unable
to affiliate, audiences were deprived of its programs-even special features of outstanding
interest. The classic example was the refusal of NBC and CBS to allow their affiliates to
carry the World Series baseball games of October, 1939, to which Mutual had secured sole
broadcasting rights. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1943).
27. The chronology of the adoption by the major networks of long-term contracts with
affiliation exclusivity clauses is persuasive that the networks' main incentive was to thwart
the growth of new chains. Columbia almost from the first tied up its stations with five year
exclusive contracts. Although NBC asserted that its network was held together by the
superiority of its programs and by the demand of listeners for NBC service, the advent of
Mutual in 1934 was immediately followed by the adoption of provisions similar to those of
Columbia. Mutual, in turn, remained an adherent of a free station-network market only
until 1940 when a fourth network organization, Transcontinental Broadcasting System,
threatened to lure away some of Mutual's outlets. CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 49.
28. The importance of catering to local interests and developing local talent has long
been emphasized by the FCC. E.g. Mid-American Broadcasting Corp., 3 PIKE & FISCHER
RADIO REG. 1547 (1947); The Observer Radio Corp., 3 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 234
(1946); Missouri Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C. 349 (1936). Its stand has received judicial
support. Simmons v. FCC, 169 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied 335 U.S. 846 (1948);
Great Western Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. FCC, 94 F.2d 244, 247-8 (D.C. Cir. 1937). For
full development of the Commission's position on the carrying of local live programs, see
FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 36-9 (1946); Comment,
Radio Program Controls, A Network of Inadequacy, 57 YALE L.J. 275 (1947); Note, Govern-
ment Control of the Content of Radio Programs, 47 COL. L. REv. 1041 (1947).
29. Advance notice of content was frequently limited to the name of the program series
and the name of the sponsor. By the time more definite descriptions were obtained, it might
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ENTER THE NETWORK RULES
After three years of exhaustive investigation,30 the FCC in 1941 issued its
Network Rules to deal with these abuses. 31 The Communications Act gives
the Commission no direct authority over the networks.3 2 But under that
statute the FCC does have the power to grant, modify, or renew the licenses
of individual stations if it finds that such action would be in the "public
convenience, interest, or necessity." " Therefore the Rules took the form
of statements of policy by the Commission that it would not grant a license
to any station owner who entered into a proscribed arrangement with a
network.3 4
be too late to reject either because no replacement could be found or because, in the case of
CBS affiliates, three weeks' notice was required. ROBINSON Op. cit. supra note 6, at 173.
30. During the year 1937 at least four resolutions had been introduced in Congress
calling for investigations of monopolistic control over broadcasting. Hearings on S. Res.
113, 14-5. Preliminary hearing before the FCC commenced in November, 1938, and in
the following six months' period 8,713 pages of testimony were taken. After issuance of a
preliminary report, briefs were filed by the networks and oral arguments presented to the
Commission. Finally supplementary briefs were accepted. With all this evidence at hand
the Commission and staff worked over the material for another six months before issuing the
final Chain Broadcasting Report containing the Rules. Id. at 16-8. During the course of
the Commission investigation Congress repeatedly urged speedier action. Hearings before
Committee on Interstate Commerce on the Nomination of Thad H. Brown on Reappointment as
Federal Communications Commissioner, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 2 (1940). Yet despite the
FCC's extraordinary procedural caution, one network official accused it of a "torpedoing
operation." Hearings on S. Res. 113, 18.
31. The Rules, as originally issued on May 2, 1941, are reprinted in CHAIN BROAD-
CASTING REPORT 91-2. Two Commissioners, Case and Craven, dissented from the Com-
mission's decision. Their dissenting opinion appears in id. at 115-53.
During the summer of 1941 further evidence was presented in a Senate investigation
and additional hearings before the FCC were granted to the networks. On the strength of
arguments made at this time, the Commission substantially amended its regulations. FCC,
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 1-3 (1941). See notes 35, 36, 38, and 42
infra.
The Rules have since been made applicable to FM and TV without significant modifica-
tion. See pages 98-103 infra. The Rules in their present form appear in 47 CODE FED.
REGS. §§ 3.101-108 (AM), 3.231-38 (FM), 3.631-38 (TV) (1949).
32. "[I]t should be pointed out that the authority of the Commission to deal with net-
works is rather limited. The Commission has no jurisdiction over networks as such and
the Commission does not have authority to license or regulate networks. In attempting
to cover problems which arise out of the relation of networks to affiliates, the Commission
cannot enact regulations which apply directly to the networks." Communication to Hon-
orable Edwin C. Johnson, Chairman, Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce from the FCC, Feb. 15, 1949, 1 PixE & FIsCHER RADIO REG. 91:131.
33. Communications Act § 309(a).
34. There was considerable controversy at the time of the promulgation of the Rules
as to whether violations by a broadcaster would inevitably lead to withdrawal of his license
or would merely be weighed adversely in reaching a general determination as to his qualifica-
tions. The Commission's language seemed mandatory, providing that "[n]o license shall be
granted to a standard broadcasting station" entering into any of the proscribed arrange-
ments with a network. 47 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 3.101-108 (1949). The majority of the
Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
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Through the abolition of restrictive practices embodied in affiliation con-
tracts, the Commission first of all sought to promote competition between
stations. Territorial exclusivity was prohibited in order to give independent
stations a chance at rejected network programs. 5 To enable affiliates to
bargain more freely for non-network advertising, the broadcasting day was
divided into four segments and option time was limited to three hours in
each segment. The notice required before a network could demand clearance
for its own programs during option time was increased from 28 to 56 days."
Outside of option time, stations were to be left free to make long-range
commitments. Network control over the rates of time which it did not
actually purchase was outlawed. 7
apparently assumed that this language meant automatic denial of a license to any stations
not complying with the regulations. Id. at 422. Justice Frankfurter, however, insisted in
his dissenting opinion that this was not true, arguing that "[u]nder § 309 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 the Commission is required to examine each application for a station license
and to determine in each case whether a grant would serve public interest. . . .No an-
nouncement of general licensing policy can relieve the Commission of its statutory obliga-
tion to examine each application for a license and determine whether a grant or denial is
required by the public interest." Id. at 431-2. This view was apparently followed by the
Court in National Broadcasting System v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943), in which
Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion. The Commission's recent decision in Don
Lee Broadcasting System, 5 PixE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 1179 (1949), should set all doubts
at rest. Despite findings of flagrant violations, no license was withdrawn. See pages 96-8,
104 infra.
35. "No license shall be granted to a standard broadcasting station having any con-
tract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a network organization which
prevents or hinders another station serving substantially the same area from broadcasting
the network's programs not taken by the former station, or which prevents or hinders
another station serving a substantially different area from broadcasting any program of the
network organization. This section shall not be construed to prohibit any contract, arrange-
ment, or understanding between a station and a network organization pursuant to which
the station is granted the first call in its primary service area upon the programs of the net-
work organization." 47 CODE FED. REGS. § 3.102 (1949). The last sentence was added in
October, 1941, see note 1 supra, for the purpose of clarifying the meaning of the regulation.
6 JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS BAR ASSOCIATION 36-7 (1941).
36. "No license shall be granted to a standard broadcasting station which options for
network programs any time subject to call on less than 56 days' notice, or more time than a
total of three hours within each of four segments of the broadcast day as herein described.
The broadcast day is divided into four segments as follows: 8 a.m. to 1 p.m.; 1 p.m. to 6 p.m.;
6 p.m. to 11 p.m.; 11 p.m. to 8 a.m. Such options may not be exclusive as against other net
work organizations and may not prevent or hinder the station from optioning or selling any
or all of the time covered by the option, or other time, to other network organizations." 47
CODE FED. REGS. § 3.104 (1949).
This regulation was the most significant concession to the networks embodied in the
Commission's amendments of October, 1941. The original Rules permitted no option power
whatsoever. CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 92.
37. "No license shall be granted to a standard broadcasting station having any con-
tract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a network organization
under which the station is prevented or hindered from, or penalized for, fixing or altering its
rates for the sale of broadcast time for other than the network's programs." 47 CODE FED.
REGS. § 3.108 (1949).
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Even more extensive efforts were made to foster network competition for
stations and advertising. NBC was forced to divest itself of one of its net-
works-" Ownership by any network of two stations in one market or of one
station in a market not otherwise adequately served was proscribed."
Under the Rules a network could not contractually bind a station to exclu-
sive affiliation, 40 or require clearance of time sold to competing networks
even during option hours.41 Affiliation contracts themselves were limited to
two years.42
Finally the regulations were designed to restore to the individual licensee
a greater measure of control over programming. No longer could he option
away his entire broadcasting day or bind himself to exclusive affiliation.
43
The requirement of increased notice for clearance orders assured greater con-
tinuity for local and spot programs. The Rules insisted that the licensee
have full discretion to reject unsatisfactory or unsuitable network commer-
cial offers and to substitute local interest programs.44 The licensee was to
38. "No license shall be issued to a standard broadcast station affiliated with a network
organization which maintains more than one network: Provided, that this section shall not
be applicable if such networks are not operated simultaneously, or if there is no substantial
overlap in the territory served by the group of stations comprising each such network."
47 CODE FED. REGS. § 3.107 (1949).
In October, 1941, the effective date of this Rule was postponed indefinitely in order to
give NBC time to negotiate a sale of its Blue Network. See page 000 infra.
39. "No license will be granted to a network organization, or to any person directly or
indirectly controlled by or under common control with a network organization, for more
than one standard broadcast station where one of the stations covers substantially the
service area of the other station, or for any standard broadcast station in any locality where
the existing standard broadcast stations are so few or of such unequal desirability (in terms
of coverage, power, frequency, or other related matters) that competition would be sub-
stantially restrained by such licensing." 47 CODE FED. REGS. § 3.106 (1949).
40. "No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any contract,
arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a network organization under which
the station is prevented or hindered from, or penalized for, broadcasting the programs of any
other network organization." 47 CODE FED. REGS. § 3.101 (1949).
41. See § 3.104, note 36 supra.
42. "No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any contract,
arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a network organization which pro-
%,ides, by original term, provisions for renewal, or otherwise for the affiliation of the station
for a period longer than 2 years: Provided, that a contract, arrangement, or understanding
for a period up to 2 years may be entered into within six months prior to the commencement
of such period." 47 CODE FED. EGS. § 3.103 (1949).
In the original Chain Regulations contracts were limited to one year. CHAIN BROAD-
CASTING REPORT 91-2. In the October 1941 revision of the Rules, the Commission explained
that the contract period was being lengthened because of the contemporaneous extension of
the license period from one to two years in recognition of the maturity of the industry. 6
JOURNAL OF THE COMMUNICATIONS BAR ASSOCIATION 37 (1941).
43. See § 3.101 note 40 supra; § 3.104 note 36 supra.
44. "No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any contract,
arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a network organization which
(a) with respect to programs offered pursuant to an affiliation contract, prevents or hinders
the station from rejecting or refusing network programs which the station reasonably be-
[Vol. 60: 78
19511 IMPACT OF FCC'S CHAIN BROADCASTING RULES 87
be free to build up a balanced program structure from a diversity of sources-
network, spot, and local-in order to fulfill his statutory responsibility of
operating his station in the public interest.
PRESENT STATUS OF BROADCASTING UNDER THE RULES
While the FCC hailed the Rules as the magna charta of radio,45 network
spokesmen prophesied the doom of chain broadcasting. 4" The networks
warned that radio advertising revenues would dwindle; 47 that small stations
in particular would suffer because businessmen would advertise, if at all,
only through powerful outlets in rich markets; 48 that public service pro-
grams would be sharply curtailed; 41 and that the rules were in realty a
prelude to government operation of radio in America."0 Instead, under the
Rules network revenues have soared, 5 broadcasters have more than trebled
in number,5 2 any diminution in sustaining programs can more accurately
lieves to be unsatisfactory or unsuitable; or which (b) with respect to network programs so
offered or already contracted for, prevents the station from rejecting or refusing any pro-
gram which in its opinion, is contrary to the public interest, or from substituting a program
of outstanding local or national importance." 47 CODE FED. REGS. § 3.105 (1949).
45. Press Release from the FCC dated May 4, 1941, p. 2. The Commission, however,
admitted that it was ". . . under no illusion that the regulations . . .will solve all ques-
tions of public interest with respect to the network system of program distribution." CHAIN
BROADCASTING REPORT 88.
46. See, e.g., CBS, WHAT THE NEW RULES MEAN (1941); TRAMMEL (president of
NBC), STATEMENT BEFORE SENATE CO.%IMTTEE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1941). Na-
tional and Columbia pointed in particular to the minority views of Commissioners Craven
and Case, who had expressed their belief that the Rules might well "plunge the American
broadcasting system from the known of good public service to the unknown in which all the
6onsequences cannot be foreseen. It is, therefore, no exaggeration to predict that the deci-
sion of the majority instead of resulting in 'free competition,' would nore likely create
'anarchy' or a kind of business chaos in which service to the public would suffer." CHAIN
BROADCASTING REPORT 116-7. Mutual, on the other hand, defended the Rules. MBS,
VHITE PAPER (1941).
47. Broadcasting Magazine, May 19, 1941, p. 40.
48. ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 6, 185-9.
49. Opponents of the Rules argued that the responsibility for producing sustaining pro-
grams, such as world news round-ups, symphony concerts, and discussion forums, would be
so diffused as to become "nobody's business." CBS, WHAT THE NEW RULEs MEAN 31
(1941).
50. E.g., editorial, Broadcasting Magazine, May 12, 1941, p. 18; report of speech of
Mark Ethridge at the annual convention of the National Association of Broadcasters,
Broadcasting Magazine, May 19, 1941, p. 17.
51. Network time sales have risen from $79,621,534 in 1941 to an estimated $127,590,-
000 in 1949. Broadcasting Magazine Yearbook 12 (1950). The net income of all national
networks, including income from network-owned stations, has risen from a total of 813,-
705,043 for 1940 to a total of $15,280,131 for 1948. FCC, ANNUAL REPORT 61 (1941);
FCC, ANNUAL REPORT 52 (1949).
52. In July 1941 there were 897 standard broadcasting stations, 49 commercial FM
stations, and only 2 commercial TV stations, making a total of 948. FCC, ANNUAL REPORT
61-2 (1941). By September 1950 there was a total of 2,970 stations on the air, of which
2,178 were AM, 686 were FM, and 106 were TV. Broadcasting Magazine, Sept. 25, 1950, p. 9 2 .
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be attributed to increased expenditure for advertising," and government
operation of radio is no closer today than ever. But despite the disappear-
ance of all prohibited clauses from affiliation contracts, the hopes of the
FCC for a new era in the radio industry have proven largely illusory.
Competition on the station level
Competition between stations continues on extremely unequal terms.
Since affiliation guarantees both a minimum of profitable network pro-
grams and a competitive advantage in bargaining for other advertising-
national and local-the goal of most stations is still to join a network.54
Occasionally an independent station can prosper by catering to minority
tastes or foreign language groups,5 5 or by specializing in local events. But
in general unaffiliated stations must be content with advertising left-overs.56
53. Many programs which began as sustaining programs are now broadcast as com-
mercials. For example, businessmen have shown an increasing readiness to back prestige
programs like the Metropolitan Opera and the New York Philharmonic Symphony. SIEP-
MANN, RADIO's SECOND CHANCE 72 (1947).
54. Approximately 60% of the money paid by advertisers for chain programs is re-
tained by the network for line charges and other overhead costs. FCC, BROADCAST FINAN-
CIAL DATA FOR NETWORKS AND AM, FM, AND TELEvISION STATIONS (1946). Consequently
the rates per hour actually received by affiliates may not be as high as could be obtained in
the national spot or local advertising market. But the affiliate incurs no production or sales
expenses when network programs are carried, which compensates for the relatively low gross
return. Of greater importance, however, is the assurance of popular, well publicized pro-
grams which will build up a station's audience, because it is the size of the audience that
attracts local and national spot advertisers. Although few listeners stay tuned to one station
merely because it is affiliated with a particular network, ROBINSON, Op. cit. supra note 6, at
15 1-2, sponsors realize that a station break announcement will be more widely heard after a
network favorite tIan after a disc jockey program. See Transcript of Hearings before FCC,
pp. 148-9, 578-9, In the Matter of Representation of Affiliated Broadcast Stations by
National Networks for the Sale of National Spot Advertising and Other Commercial Time,
Docket No. 9080 (1948) (hereafter cited as Spot Sales Hearings). The experience of station
WSAY, Rochester, see pages 89-90 infra, illustrates the advantages of carrying network
programs. As soon as it became clear that WSAY would no longer carry American and
Mutual programs, thousands of dollars worth of local and national spot advertising were
withdrawn. Transcript of Record, pp. 50-3, Federal Broadcasting System v. American
Broadcasting Co., 167 F.2d 349 (2nd Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 821 (1948).
55. In most large metropolitan areas there are minority groups whose interests cannot
be served by network programming. Independent local stations can, therefore, attract
advertising money by directing their programs specifically at these groups. Examples of
stations successful in this specialized broadcasting are WQXR, New York (classical music
lovers); WTEL, Philadelphia (foreign language groups); WDIA, Memphis (Negro popula-
tion).
56. One indication that independent stations have more difficulty than network affil-
iates in attracting advertising is that their station rates for spot sales are generally lower
than those of affiliates. Of the 90 largest metropolitan areas in the country, 77 are served
by both affiliated and independent stations. In all but one of these 77 areas, the average
affiliate charges more for daytime station break announcements than does the average in-
dependent. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RADIO STATION REPRESENTATIVES, SPOT RADIO
ESTIMATOR (1949). Even better evidence of a broadcaster's competitive position is his
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Although the tremendous expansion in the number of stations since the
war has brought competition to areas where previously one or two broad-
casters had a monopoly,57 it has also made it increasingly difficult for in-
dependent stations to obtain network programs. In the pre-war period
many markets were not served by a sufficient number of full-time outlets
to permit all national networks to secure exclusive affiliates; hence un-
affiliated stations in those areas could successfully bargain for network
programs. Now there are stations eager for affiliation wherever coverage
is sought."3 The result is that any local station which is unwilling or unable
to sign an affiliation contract must operate without network programs. The
experience of station WSAY is illustrative. Prior to 1947 there were only
three full-time stations in Rochester-a National affiliate, a Columbia
income in relation to that of other stations with identical technical facilities. The following
table giving comparative incomes of 1313 AM stations in 1948 indicates that in every cate-
gory except the very lowest-local part-time stations-affiliates made more money than
independents.




CATEGORY OF STATION AFFILIATE STATIONS
Number Average Number Average
of stations income of stations income
Clear channel 50 kw., unlimited time 462 $341,257 0
Clear channel 50 kw., part time 43 171,278 0
Clear channel 5-25 kw., unlimited time 18 87,592 114 $67,961
Regional, unlimited 300 70,993 42 22,120
Regional, part time 31 12,542 154 5,577
Local, unlimited 500 14,055 141 7,101
Local, day and part time 8 3,484 58 4,599
All stations' 904 51,405 409 9,865
Source: FCC, STATISTICS OF THE COAnsUNICATIONS INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 192
(1948).
1 Does not include the operation of 11 stations owned by national networks.
2 Includes two stations not serving as outlets for national networks.
3 Includes one station not serving as an outlet for a national network.
4 Includes one part-time station.
57. The Commission has encouraged the phenomenal postwar growth in the number of
stations by licensing new stations without regard to the economic effect upon existing sta-
tions or upon the new station itself in a given community or area. The Voice of Cullman,
6 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 161 (1949) (possibility of competitive inroads is no basis for
denying license to a new station in the same service area); FCC, AN ECONO.%IC STUDY OF
STANDARD BROADCASTING 1 (1947). This policy dates back to the Supreme Court decision
in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1106;
13 So. CALIF. L. REV. 450; 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 121 (1940).
58. In 1941, of 96 metropolitan districts in the United States with populations over
100,000, only 32 had four or more full time commercial stations. Hearings on S. Res. 113,
221 (1941). Now practically all metropolitan districts are served by six or more stations.
WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 532 (1948).
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affiliate, and an independent. The independent, WSAY, contracted for
programs from American and Mutual on an individual basis and thus re-
tained control of the rates charged to advertisers for network programs.
Shortly after the war, the FCC licensed two new Rochester stations, which
immediately affiliated with American and Mutual respectively. Thereafter,
WSAY was deprived of all network service, 5 and, as a result, suffered a
drastic decline in its revenues. 0
Any expectation that the rule against territorial exclusivity would allevi-
ate the competitive disadvantage of unaffiliated stations was short-lived.
In the first place, networks are under no affirmative obligation to offer re-
jected programs to independents.6 1 Secondly, popular commercial pro-
grams are rarely rejected by affiliates, and independents can seldom afford
the expense of sustainers12 Finally, even if an independent station owner
obtains a network program, his tenure is insecure, so that he may lose the
program as soon as local popularity is achieved. An affiliate can reclaim the
program at the end of the independent's contract term, which is usually
limited to a period of a few months.
59. Gordon Brown, the licensee of station WSAY, had long been a thorn in the side of
both networks, refusing to sign as a regular affiliate and demanding compensation greater
than that paid to other comparable outlets. Hence it was not surprising that American and
Mutual seized the first opportunity to break off with WSAY. When they did, Brown
brought a treble damage action alleging conspiracy to boycott him from the national ad-
vertising market and requesting a preliminary injunction to restrain both networks from
withdrawing their programs. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming this denial, Federal Broadcasting
System v. American Broadcasting Company 167 F.2d 349 (2nd Cir. 1948), started out with
the proposition that networks are not common carriers and are under no obligation, in the
absence of concerted action, to offer their programs on any but their own terms. The court
then went on to reject Brown's contention that the uniformity of business practices and
affiliation contracts amounted to conspiracy. Rather, the court felt, the similarity resulted
from "common business solutions to identical problems in a competitive industry" and
from the uniform "requirements of the Federal Communications Commission governing the
stations." Id. at 352. After denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, 335 U.S. 821 (1948),
Brown gave up his court battle. While this particular station owner undoubtedly pitched
his sights too high, his complete rebuff will serve as strong deterrent to any potential in-
dividualist.
60. In 1947 WSAY was earning in excess of $200,000 annually, Transcript of Record,
p. 48, Federal Broadcasting System v. American Broadcasting System, 167 F.2d 349 (2nd
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 821 (1948), but in the succeeding year it lost $52,000.
Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1973, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1949).
61. Rule 3.102 is couched in purely negative terms forbidding affiliates to bind their
network to territorial exclusivity. See note 35 supra. As a rule, a network will offer a pro-
gram to competitors of its affiliates only as a last resort to satisfy a sponsor seeking nation-
wide coverage. This occurs only rarely, such as when an affiliate finds the advertising on a
particular network program objectionable (e.g., Duffy's Tavern, NBC variety program ad-
vertising Blatz beer, is broadcast in Kansas City by an independent, KCMO, because the
NBC affiliate there refused to carry the program).
62. Networks generally charge independents a nominal fee, such as $100 an hour plus
line charges to the nearest point on the regular network. But this expense coupled with the
red tape involved in securing even one program has kept requests down to a negligible num-
ber.
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Competition among stations for national advertising is further threatened
by the networks' practice of representing certain key affiliates in the sale of
non-network time to national sponsors in the spot market.63 Ordinarily a
station, affiliated or unaffiliated, deals with spot market advertisers through
independent station representation agencies who are in direct competition
with the networks for advertising money.14 Within this framework all
stations should have reasonable access to spot advertising. When a network
represents its affiliates in the spot market, however, it is in a position to
exercise powerful bargaining leverage on a national advertiser who is seek-
ing choice hours for programs which he sponsors over the network. 5 As yet
the networks' invasion of the spot field has been limited.6 Indeed, the
initial influence of their competitive challenge has forced independent
representation agencies to improve their service. But there are dangers in-
herent in the possible expansion of network representation of key stations.
63. Following a complaint by the National Association of Radio Station Representa-
tives, the FCC in July, 1948, launched a full scale inquiry into this network practice.
Hearings were scheduled in November and December of 1948 to determine whether NBC,
CBS, and ABC were violating chain rules 3.104 and 3.108 in their spot representation ca-
pacity, and whether, in the alternative, additional rules should be promulgated to eradicate
or contain network representation as contrary to the public interest. On July 21, 1950, the
Commission announced that the evidence adduced at the Spot Hearings was insufficient
to support a finding of violation of the Chain Rules, but deferred its decision as to the de-
sirability of new regulations on the subject. FCC, Public Notice No. 52837, July 21, 1950.
64. To some extent the media of spot and network radio serve different purposes and
appeal to different types of advertisers. Only 40% of spot advertising takes the form of
transcribed feature or local live programs of five minutes to an hours duration, the rest con-
sisting of short commercial announcements of several minutes or less bracketing or interrupt-
ing other programs. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from the National Asso-
ciation of Radio Representatives, dated March 10, 1950, in Yale Law Library. Easily
tailored in terms of cost and geographic scope, spot campaigns interest primarily those
businessmen who plan intensive but short promotions, who seek only regional or selective
coverage, or whose budgets are limited. The expensive but generally superior network ser-
vice attracts only a relatively few large, nationwide advertisers-a total of 310 in 1944. FCC,
AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF STANDARD BROADCASTING 64 (1947). But there is a broad area of
overlap: many advertisers use both media and there is much switching back and forth.
Within this area competition is and should continue to be brisk. For illustrations of intense
competition between the two media and exhaustive argument concerning its importance,
see Transcript of Spot Sales Hearings 18 et seq.
65. Networks charge advertisers different rates for different hours of the broadcasting
day. Generally the top rates are for the hours between 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. See NBC
affiliation contract in ROBINSON, op. cit supra note 6, at 247. But no rate distinction is made
between the same hours on different days. For example, a particular hour on Sunday or
Friday nights, which are the most popular with the radio audience, costs no more than the
same hour on Saturday, when relatively few people turn to their radios. Of equal importance
to the prospective time buyer is the popularity of the programs that precede and follow his
own and of the programs being broadcast over competing networks at the same time. Ob-
viously, a sponsor would expect a far larger audience if he followed the Jack Benny program
than if he competed with it.
66. Excluding network-owned stations, ABC represents one standard and one TV
affiliate in the spot market, NBC represents one AM and four television affiliates, and CBS
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If ABC, CBS, and NBC were to represent only twelve to fifteen more of
their affiliates, together they could control 50% of the spot market. 7 Fur-
thermore, when a network represents an affiliate in the sale of spot advertis-
ing, it controls the great bulk of the affiliate's revenues 11 and is in the anom-
alous position of competing -x ith itself for the sale of station time.69 The
Rules do not touch this problem.
Comtetition. at the network level
The separation of the Blue Network from NBC and its transformation
into the American Broadcasting Company represents the one solid achieve-
ment of the Rules.70 No doubt the listening public has benefitted from the
added diversity of program fare.7' But American and Mutual are still far
from being the competitive equals of National and Columbia.72 Their
represents five AM affiliates and one TV. During the recent FCC investigation, NBC
allowed representation contracts with four additional stations to lapse. Transcript of Spot
Sales Hearings 922, 950, 343. But none of the three net-works was willing to deny the pos-
sibility of expansion, though CBS suggested that for itself 15 stations might be a reasonable
limit. Id. at 825. Absent FCC restriction, the networks may be expected to take full ad-
vantage of the fertile revenue opportunities of spot representation.
67. Brief for National Association of Radio Station Representatives (petitioner), p.
24, Spot Sales Hearings.
68. Those stations which are at present represented by a network in the spot market
derive from 65 to 95 percent of their revenues from the network in its dual capacity as a
seller of network and spot time. Transcript of Spot Sales Hearings, pp. 438-9, 516, 599,
1058.
69. All three networks protested that their network and spot sales departments were
entirely separate and in fact did compete with one another. A similar claim of "intramural"
competition between NBC's Red and Blue networks was summarily dismissed by the FCC
at the time of the issuance of the Rules: "As long as all the efforts of the employees redound
to the benefit of a single employer, there is merely the shadow of competition without its
substance." CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 7.
70. The Blue Network was sold for $8,000,000 to Edward J. Noble, who reincorporated
it as the American Broadcasting Co. in October, 1943. At that time the Blue Network owned
stations WJZ, New York, WENR, Chicago, and KGO, San Francisco, and had affiliation
agreements with 168 other stations. In the Matter of Radio Corp. of America, Transferor,
and American Broadcasting System, Transferee, Docket No. 6536, Federal Communications
Commission (1943). Subsequently ABC purchased KECA, Los Angeles, and WXYZ, De-
troit, Edward J. Noble, 3 PIKE & FIsCHER RADIO REG. 449 (1946), and by 1949 had increased
the number of its affiliates to 272. FCC, ANNUAL REPORT 35 (1949).
71. For example, unlike National and Columbia, ABC's daytime programs are not a
steady drone of "soap operas." FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY Ov BROADCAST
LICENSEES 13-4 (1946). American has been a pioneer in selling time to labor unions and
management groups. It has also originated instructive forays into the area of general public
information, commencing with a reading of Hersey's "Hiroshima" and continuing with a
series of forums on the teaching profession, slum conditions, and similar matters of national
importance. These and other aspects of ABC's programming are praised in WILLIAIIS,
LISTENING 3-10 (1948).
72. Comparison of the gross radio advertising sales of the four networks demonstrates
that NBC and CBS are still several lengths ahead of their competitors. During the first
eight months of 1950, CBS was on top with $45,217,118 worth of radio advertising, followed
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limited financial success in recent years reflects the prosperity of the times
and radio's overall increased share of the advertising dollar,73 rather than
competitive inroads on their older rivals.
The newer networks are at a disadvantage in competing for advertising
because NBC and CBS still control most of the nation's powerful stations.
74
Sponsors prefer to reach a particular market through one dominant outlet;
the newer networks, however, have been able to serve many areas only by
combining a number of small stations.7 5 Conversely, the most powerful
outlets cannot be induced to switch allegiance to American and Mutual 71
closely by NBC with $41,931,767, while ABC and Mutual took in only S24,054,708 and
$10,643,868 respectively. Broadcasting Magazine, Sept. 25, 1950, p. 94. NBC and Mutual
do not publish net income figures, but figures for CBS and ABC indicate that the gap be-
tween these two networks, at least, is substantial. In 1949 CBS earned $4,184,079 and ABC
lost 8519,085. 1 Standard & Poor Corp. Descriptions 9520 (1950); 2 id. at 6796.
Furthermore, one of the avowed purposes of the Rules was to promote the development of
new chains. CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 75; Hearings on S. Res. 113, 146; see Com-
ment, FCC Regulation of Competition among Radio Networks, 51 YALE L.J. 448 (1942). But
the only three attempts to establish new national networks-Transcontinental Network,
Ed Wynn Network, and Associated Broadcasters Network-have been complete failures.
At least one commentator thinks that a fifth network could not survive under present eco-
nomic conditions. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEvIsION LAW 531 (1948).
73. Radio accounted for 10% of the advertising gross billings distributed through the
various media of communication in 1934. By 1940 its share had risen to 21%, and in 1946
to 25%. FCC, AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF STANDARD BROADCASTING 59-60 (1947).
74. There are three basic classes of standard broadcasting stations-clear channel,
regional, and local. Clear channel stations typically have 50,000 watt transmitters, while
regional and local stations are limited to 5,000 and 250 watts respectively. 47 CODE FED.
REGS. § 3.21 (1949). Furthermore, clear channel stations are more or less protected
from sky wave interference by the FCC's practice of licensing only ofte or two full time clear
channel stations on each frequency. "I-A" stations are those clear channel stations with
only one station on a frequency, whereas "I-B" stations are those with two. A I-A station
may be clear channel either full time or part time; every I-B station, on the other hand, is
clear channel full time. At night the effective service area of a clear channel station is greatly
extended through sky wave propagation, but the coverage of regional and local stations is
considerably reduced because of interference from nearby stations on the same channel.
47 CODE FED. REGS. § 3.22-7 (1949). WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 230-5 (1948).
NBC and CBS either own or have affiliation contracts with twenty-one of the twenty-
three full time I-A stations in the country and twenty-one of the twenty-eight 50,000 watt
I-B stations. ABC has a single full time I-A station and five 50,000 watt I-B stations. It
has the equivalent of another full time I-A station, however, because in Chicago two part
time I-A stations together control all the time on a particular clear channel, and ABC owns
one of these stations (WENR) and is affiliated with the other (WLS). Finally, Mutual has
only one full time I-A station and one 50,000 watt I-B station. BROADCASTING MAGAZINE
YEARBOOK 69-325 (1950).
75. In order to coverall the important markets of the nation, Mutual has found it neces-
sary to affiliate with 520 stations, American with 272, Columbia with 178, and National
with 166. FCC, ANNUAL REPORT 35 (1949). For a graphic presentation of the relative po-
sition of thefournetworks, see the maps in BROADCASTING MAGAZINE YEARBOOK 379, 381,
389, 391 (1950).
76. Eight of the stations presently affiliated with ABC were formerly affiliated with
CBS and three were formerly with NBC. But there is little reason to think that American
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because these networks do not have the high-paying advertisers and the
most popular programs.7 The two year limitation on network-station con-
tracts has in no way affected this basic dilemma, and the prohibition of ex-
clusivity has not resulted in extensive dual affiliation. 8
Since the four networks were not competitive equals at the time the Rules
went into effect, the Rules, to the extent that they have made clearance less
automatic, have actually hindered the development of the younger chains.
By 1943 both National and Columbia were already distributing a full sched-
ule of popular programs, but American and Mutual were still very much in
the building process.79 Inasmuch as affiliates are more likely to object to
network requests for additional hours than to mere maintenance of the
status quo, American at least has lost substantial advertising revenue be-
cause of failure or delay in securing the necessary number of outlets."
lured these stations away from the older networks. Instead the evidence suggests that in
most cases the impetus for the switch came from National or Columbia. For in all but three
of the markets involved, NBC and CBS affiliates are presently offering equal or better
coverage than the affiliates of ABC. Since 1943 Mutual has affiliated with four former
Columbia affiliates and no former NBC affiliate. Again, however, the older chain has not
suffered from the change. Furthermore, it should be noted that none of the stations in-
volved in any of these realignments was Class I-A and only one was Class I-B. BROADCASTING
MAGAZINE YEARBOOK (1943-9) passim.
77. The results of the most recent of the monthly surveys by the A.C. Neilsen Co.,
official rater of national radio programs, indicates that National and Columbia distribute
the great majority of the popular programs. Of the 55 programs with the highest Neilsen
ratings, Columbia had 32, National 20, American 3, and Mutual none at all. The over-
whelming predominance of the CBS and NBC programs in the top popularity ranks extends
over almost the entire broadcasting week. Only during the daytime on Sundays do the
smaller networks take the reins away from their older competitors. National Neilsen Rat-
ings, Oct. 1-7, 1950, pp. 8-11.
78. As of December, 1949, only 16 small stations were members of two national net-
works. Half of these outlets were affiliated with both Mutual and ABC, and the others
with Mutual and either National or Columbia. BROADCASTING MAGAZINE YEARBOOK
69-325 (1950). This represents a decrease from 1938, when Mutual had arrangements with
30 NBC or CBS stations. CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 31. The principal reason for this
decline is, of course, the increase in the number of stations in most areas.
79. In 1942, for example, Mutual's gross advertising billings totalled $9,636,122 and
the Blue Network's totalled S15,782,493, in contrast to gross billings for Columbia of
$45,593,125. BROADCASTING MAGAZINE YEARBOOK 18 (1943). See also minutes of a meeting
of various ABC affiliates, held on February 25, 1947: "Mark [Woods, President of ABC]
explained that .. .when the network rules went into effect, our main competitors, namely
NBC and CBS were set-the rules made no difference to them. But, for ABC they meant
a lot because our network was just starting and needed the cooperation of all the stations in
order to build itself into a great network. . . .Mark pointed out that their main competi-
tion is NBC and CBS and Mutual sometimes. The matter of local and network option time
is no problem to NBC or CBS. Their stations always clear, because they have been filled
up for years." Transcript of Spot Sales Hearings 75, 78.
80. In 1948 ABC lost contracts with advertisers totaling almost $4,000,000 because
of affiliate recalcitrance. Communication from American Broadcasting Co. to the Federal
Communications Commission, dated September 25, 1948.
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Station responsibility
The Network Rules have not materially increased local station responsi-
bility. Affiliation contracts have been revised so that they comply scrupu-
lously with the FCC mandate."1 But despite the fact that the Rules cover
informal as well as contractual arrangements, 8 2 networks can subtly bring
pressure to bear on affiliates in ways that are very difficult to uncover. 3
The pressure is effective because the networks still have a superior bargain-
ing position. The manager of an affiliated station realizes that networks
naturally prefer to deal with outlets that will accept without protest all
commercial programs which are offered, whether inside or outside option
time. He knows that if he protests too much he may fall into disfavor and
ultimately be disaffiliated. As a result, any station associated with a net-
work is strongly tempted to forget about local obligations and become a
mere conduit for network programs. Moreover, chain representation of
affiliates in the spot market involves yet another threat to independent
operation. When a netvork assumes this dual function of selling network
and spot time, it is in a position to influence non-network rates and to exert
control over theoretically independent station time.
8 4
81. See Current ABC and NBC affiliation contracts in Yale Law Library.
82. The prohibitions apply to "any contract, arrangement or understanding, express
or implied. . . ." 47 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 3.101-8 (1949). The FCC has interpreted the word
"implied" very broadly: "The Chain Broadcasting Regulations have clear application not
only to prohibited relationships between network and stations which are expressed in formal
written agreements, but to prohibited relationships which may be established through tacit
understandings or courses of conduct which have the same effect as formal written agree-
ments .... A tacit understanding imposed by a network upon its affiliates under which
the stations affiliated with the network are expected to operate and do in fact generally
operate contrary to the provisions of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations is as much a
violation of those rules as if the forbidden course of conduct were the result of a formally
written contract spelling out the forbidden practices." Don Lee Broadcasting System,
5 PiKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 1179, 1198 (1949).
83. Top network officials try sedulously to avoid flagrantly coercive acts. The FCC,
however, has evidence that the president of one national network, at a meeting called by
affiliates to protest disregard of their independence, strongly indicated his disapproval of
the affiliates' failure to clear unoptioned time; and that the vice-president of another national
network strongly criticized the attempts of an affiliate to secure advantageous spot adver-
tising for time also sought by the network. Transcript of Spot Sales Hearings, pp. 74, 91.
And of course a network can express its displeasure in more subtle ways, such as by in-
sisting on an option to terminate a two year affiliation contract on six months' notice, or by
discriminating against contumacious stations in negotiating with an advertiser who wants
less than full network coverage.
These extra-contractual pressures are extremely difficult to isolate or prove. Station
owners are loath to risk loss of their valuable network connections and hence rarely volunteer
evidence. Communication to Honorable Edwin C. Johnson, Chairman, Interstate Com-
merce Committee from the FCC, Feb. 15, 1949, 1 PiKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 91:131.
Probably most affiliates who are enjoying a profitable relationship with a network feel that
if their status is slavery, they are certainly happy slaves. See, e.g., statement of Harry
Bannister, General Manager, Stations WWJ, WXVWJ-FM, and WWJ-TV, Detroit, Michigan,
Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 298 (1947).
84. For example, since a network's primary function is production and distribution of
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An illustration of extreme network dominance of station operation Nlas
presented by the recent FCC hearings on renewal of licenses of stations be-
longing to Don Lee Broadcasting System, West Coast associate of Mutual.85
Don Lee's affiliation contracts were in strict conformity with the Network
Rules."5 But by the exertion of constant pressure and thinly veiled threats
of disaffiliation,n the network was able to vitiate the protection which the
Rules were designed to afford member stations. Don Lee informed its
member stations that they must choose between independent operation and
affiliation, and that the contractual rights guaranteed affiliates by the FCC
Rules were inimical to efficient operation and expansion of the network."8
Affiliates were discouraged from carrying programs of other networks. 89
Demands for clearance on as little as two weeks' notice frustrated develop-
ment of local programs." Don Lee assured its members of only three and a
chain programs, it might well be tempted to subordinate spot sales to network sales, or to
jockey spot programs in order to make room for new network features. See Brief for Na-
tional Association of Radio Station Representatives (petitioner), pp. 27-31 Spot Sales
Hearings.
85. 5 Pncu & FIscHER RADIO REG. 1179 (1949). While Don Lee is nominally only a
regional network, it owns a substantial share of the outstanding stock of Mutual and ac-
counts for all of Mutual's coverage of California, Oregon, and Washington.
The Don Lee proceeding began in February, 1946, when Don Lee's application for re-
newal of licenses of four stations owned and operated by the network was designated by the
FCC for hearing. Among other things the Commission at that time had evidence that the
management of Don Lee had caused its affiliates to violate Chain Broadcasting Rules
3.101, 3.104, and 3.105. Hence the Commission felt that the network management might
not be of sufficiently high character to merit renewal of the licenses of the network-owned
stations. Id. at 1181, 1198. The Commission held hearings from January 14 to 17, 1947.
When it issued its final decision in December, 1949, however, the Commission refused to
revoke any licenses. See page 104, infra.
86. Id. at 1183.
87. Don Lee had established a well defined routine for following up any refusal of an
affiliate to clear time for network programs, whether inside or outside option hours. Patrick
Campbell, executive in charge of station relations, apparently spent a major portion of his
time in relentlessly harassing contumacious stations. Id. at 1191.
When KDON of Monterey, California, for example, objected to carrying network
shows outside of option time, stating that it had to give some attention to local accounts,
Don Lee commenced a barrage of "persuasive" correspondence. Finally the network pointed
out that it had already been approached by persons who were interested in building a new
station in Monterey and who promised 1C0% cooperation if granted affiliation. Ibid.
88. Id. at 1190.
89. Letters from Lewis Weiss, vice president, general manager, and a director of Don
Lee, to various affiliates demonstrate that he objected strenuously to any of their attempts
to carry programs of other networks despite their supposed freedom to do so under Rule
3.104, supra note 36. Thus when KVCV of Redding, California, contemplated carrying a
Blue Network program at an hour not yet sold by Don Lee, Weiss insisted that he must be
in a position to guarantee the whole network to any sponsor who sought the time in ques-
tion. At other times Don Lee insisted on clearance even though certain stations were al-
ready carrying programs of the Associated Broadcasting Company, a competing regional
chain. Id. at 1185.
90. It was the general practice of Don Lee to insist on clearance both inside and outside
I
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half hours a day for non-network operations, insisting that almost all the
popular listening hours be reserved for network programs. 1 No disruption
of network schedules was tolerated even to permit coverage of such events as
state election returns and political conventions, local news, and local athletic
contests and religious services.9 2 The network repeatedly tried to substitute
its standards of taste and public interest for those of its affiliates." In one
instance Don Lee even tried to purge a local station of an executive who
had in the past demonstrated his independence.9 4 Although the FCC has
of option time on less than the 56 days notice provided for in the Chain Rules. On Novem-
ber 6, 1944, for instance, Don Lee informed its affiliates that a network program was to
commence the following December 4. Station KFXM, San Bernardino, California, pleaded
that this would disrupt local news presentation. Insisting that clearance be accorded never-
theless, Sidney Gaynor, Don Lee sales manager, admitted that other stations were also
"unhappy about it," but concluded, "We can't hold up the wheels of progress." At another
time, the network gave only 7 days notice before broadcasting a program called "What's
the Name of That Song," and then a month later gave but 22 days notice before shifting the
same program to another hour. Id. at 1186.
This practice also manifested itself in the refusal of the network to permit its affiliates
to guarantee local sponsors more than one or two weeks notice of cancellation. When station
KFRE, Fresno, California, pointed out that a local sponsor insisted on a 56 days notice
provision, Gaynor advised the affiliate to grant the advertiser's wishes. He added, however,
that if the network should decide later that it wanted this time, the station was to give its
sponsor only as much notice as Don Lee had provided the station and let the advertiser sue
if he didn't like it. Id. at 1187.
91. In a memorandum to affiliates, Don Lee indicated that it would guarantee only the
following daytime hours for local programming:
7:30- 8:00 AM Monday thru Saturday
9:30-10:00 AM Monday thru Friday
12:00 Noon-1:00 PM Monday thru Friday
12:00 Noon-1:00 PM Sunday
1:30- 2:30 PM Monday thru Friday
3:00- 3:30 PM Monday thru Friday
During all other hours of the day Don Lee felt free to demand clearance for network pro-
grams. Thus in both the morning (8 a.m. to 1 p.m.) and afternoon (11 p.m. to 6 p.m.) seg-
ments of the day Don Lee in effect optioned from 31Y to 5 hours in disregard of the maximum
of 3 hours per segment set by the Chain Rules. Id. at 1188.
92. Id. at 1192. Don Lee refused to permit KFRE of Fresno to broadcast its own
V-E Day program, even though the affiliate promised to transcribe and broadcast at a later
hour the two network commercials that would have been displaced. Ibid.
93. The network officials of Don Lee had definite ideas as to what was the best pro-
gramming for their affiliates. For example, they tried hard to convince stations that it was
preferable to shift local shows rather than network shows, even if this required transcribing
special local programs like football and basketball games. Id. at 1193. Furthermore, when
KFRE of Fresno threatened to cancel certain Mutual programs sponsored by laxative con-
cerns which it found objectionable and against the public interest, Don Lee tried vociferously
to persuade the station to reconsider and to defer to the standards of the networks. Id.
at 1194.
The Commission found that practices such as these on the part of the network induced
its affiliates to violate Rule 3.105, supra note 44. Id. at 1191-2.
94. Weiss made it clear to J. E. Rodman, licensee of KFRE, Fresno, that Don Lee
would not affiliate with Rodman's Bakersfield station if Paul Bartlett, the "uncooperative"
station manager of KFRE, were also made manager of the new station. Id. at 1195.
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made no full-scale investigation of any other network, at least one Com-
missioner felt that parallel activities were indicated in other chains."
NEW DEVELOPMENTS: FM AND TV
FM
At the time the Network Rules were issued, only 49 commercial FM sta-
tions were in operation."5 Soon thereafter wartime restrictions temporarily
halted development of this new broadcasting medium; but by 1945 the stage
was set for full-scale expansion of FM,9 7 and the FCC was deluged with ap-
plications for FM licenses.98 It was reliably estimated that the FM spectrum
could accommodate from 2,000 to 5,000 new stations free from interference
with one another.99
If the Commission had taken the bull by the horns, it could have used
FM to revolutionize the competitive structure of the radio industry. The
key to this opportunity is that FM stations, in addition to providing better
service, all cover an approximately uniform area."' The maximum effective
95. Concurring opinion of Commissioner Jones, id. at 1201-2. See note 83 infra.
96. FCC, ANNUAL REPORT 62 (1941).
97. The tremendous potential of FM was the major theme of SIEPMANN, RADIO'S
SECOND CHANCE (1947). Informed members of the radio industry evidently concurred. For
example, Hugh Beville, NBC's director of research, wrote in 1948, "The greatest signifi-
cance of FM, to those interested in the field of mass communications, lies in the fact that it
permits many more broadcasting stations to be operated than has been possible with the
AM system of broadcasting. This is going to introduce greater competition in broadcasting
than the newspaper field has ever known .... There is little question in the minds of most
students of radio that FM will be the standard sound broadcasting system of the future.
Its technical superiority seems to assure this ... .. 25 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 6 (1948).
The predictions of Paul W. Kesten, Executive Vice-President of CBS, were even more ex-
travagant: "FM contains in itself almost the whole future of audio broadcasting. Most of
us at CBS have believed, from the very early days of FM, that, except in certain rural areas,
FM was technically destined to replace AM transmission as surely and inevitably as the
tungsten lamp was destined to replace the old carbon filament." Broadcasting Magazine,
December 31, 1945, p. 22.
FM's major technical advantages are static-free reception, high fidelity, and freedom
from interference with other stations. See SENATE COMMITTEE TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF
SMALL BUSINESS: SMALL BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN FM BROADCASTING 2 (1946).
98. By the time the wartime "freeze" on FM construction had been lifted in 1945, the
Commission had accumulated about 600 applications for commercial FM stations. FCC,
ANNUAL REPORT 15 (1946). As of December, 1946, the FCC had granted 605 conditional
licenses, including 406 construction permits; and there were still 290 unprocessed applica-
tions pending. Broadcasting Magazine, December 23, 1946, p. 15.
99. Estimates vary as to the number of stations which could be allocated within the
frequencies assigned to FM. See, e.g., Testimony of Edwin H. Armstrong, inventor of FM,
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
680 (1943) (many thousands); SIEPMAANN, RADIO'S SECOND CHANCE 240 (1947) (5,000);
WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 599 (1948) (2,000).
100. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 599, 617 (1948). For technical details on
classification and allocation of FM stations, see 47 CODE FED. REGS. 3.201-6 (1949).
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service area of every FM station is about 100 miles in radius, 0 1 in striking
contrast to the disparity between a 50,000-watt clear channel AM station
and a 250-watt local AM station. If the Commission had determined upon a
merger of AM and FM into a single integrated aural broadcasting system,
it could have worked out a plan along the following lines. First, license only
FM stations in the more populous sections of the country, such as the west
coast and the region north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi. Second,
supplement this basic FM system by a sufficient number of clear channel
AM stations so located a's to assure adequate coverage, by each network, of
the more thinly populated areas of the South and West.1 ° 2 A scheme of this
sort would have alleviated any shortage of broadcasting frequencies, be-
cause FM's limited coverage would permit the same frequency to be used
for a number of stations.0 3 Furthermore, the scheme would have eliminated
many of the basic competitive inequalities that exist among stations and
among networks. Again because of FM's limited and uniform service area,
most stations in the country would be on roughly the same footing,' and
each network could secure equal nationwide coverage. Finally, all this
could have been achieved with no further sacrifice of local control over pro-
gramming.
Although the FCC seemed to favor the merging of AM and FM in the
general manner suggested above,"0 ' it declined to take positive action to
101. Since the useful FM signal travels along the ground, the primary service ar&a is
bounded roughly by the horizon. Greater coverage ca i be obtained by raising the trans-
mitting antenna and to a lesser extent by increasing the power. The 100-mile radius figure
assumes a transmitter of 50,000 watts and an antenna 1,000 feet high. FCC, ANNUAL RE-
PORT 67 (1940). The average radius has been estimated as 50 miles. Hearings before Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.J. Res. 78, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 76 (1948).
102. Releasing AM from metropolitan service would open up new frequencies for such
clear channel stations. For testimony as to the need for more service to farm and ranch
areas, see, generally, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2231.
80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948).
103. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 597-599 (1948).
104. Since frequency modulation would be the sole aural medium in the densely popu-
lated and hence most profitable markets of the Northeast and Pacific Coast, the FM sta-
tions in any community would each have equal coverage. In other areas where extensive
rural coverage is needed, there would be instances were FM stations with community cov-
erage would compete with clear channel AM stations which cover several states. But the
AM stations would be expected to devote much of their time to the special needs and in-
terests of the farmers, ranchers, and miners for whose benefit these stations were licensed.
Hence the local FM outlets would play a necessary role and would be able to attract ad-
vertisers aiming at the urban or community market.
105. The Commission's view as to the most desirable use of AM and FM was expressed
as early as 1940 when it said: "The Commission believes that this [FM] is one of the most
significant advances that has been made in aural broadcasting in recent years. . . . [A]mpli-
tude modulation stations in the standard broadcast band may be required indefinitely for
the purpose of giving widespread rural coverage. For coverage of centers of population and
trade areas, the new class of station offers a distinct improvement." FCC, REPORT, May 20,
1940, quoted in Edward G. Noble, 3 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 449,459 (1946). See also
WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 617 (1948).
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force the radio industry to effect any change. Instead, by moving FM
frequencies to a new band in 1945,106 the Commission actually impeded
FM's postwar expansion. This untimely Commission action, undertaken for
technical reasons of questionable validity,"7 rendered all receivers and
transmitters then in use obsolete and put FM back where it began in 1940.108
By the time FM could make a new start, the television craze was on, and
public interest in a new purely aural system had flagged.'
Moreover, in the past few years the networks have done their part to
impede the development of FM by severely restricting the operations of
those network affiliates which own both AM and FM stations. All four
networks have insisted that if such an affiliate broadcasts any network
program simultaneously over its AM and FM stations, it must duplicate
all its network programs. The affiliate, however, receives no extra com-
pensation for the FM coverage. 10 Under these conditions, AM affiliates
The FCC position on the advisability of FM and AM integration was also expressed
in its policy of favoring those applicants for FM licenses who were already owners of stand-
ard outlets and in its refusal to require any unduplicated programming of joint AM-FM
licensees. FCC, REPORT, August 24, 1945.
106. FM was moved from the 42-50 megacycles band to its present position between 88
and 108 megacycles on June 27, 1945. FCC. ANNuAL REPORT 20-1 (1945).
107. The move was motivated by the Commission's fear that FM, in the lower frequen-
cies, would be subject to extreme ionospheric interference during the maximum intensity
of the sunspot cycle. But informed supporters of the new medium, insisting that the change
was entirely unwarranted and that operations at such high frequencies will be inefficient,
continue to press for revision. Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on H.J.
Res. 78, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13-17 (1948).
108. Ibid.
109. From January 1949 to April 1950, 3,641,327 television sets were produced. During
this same period 2,148,757 receivers were made with FM bands, but only 32,240 of these
were FM-only sets. Statistics collected by the FCC from reports submitted by Radio
Manufacturers Association, on file in Yale Law Library.
110. This policy was made possible by the FCC's refusal, in 1945, to require any separate
programming of joint AM-FM licensees. FCC, REPORT, August 24, 1945. Three years
later, however, the Commission pointed out to the networks that by conditioning use of any
network programs over affiliates' FM stations on complete duplication, the networks were
violating the letter if not the spirit of Chain Regulation 3.235, which guarantees affil-
iates a right of rejection. The networks replied that since their practice was to charge no
extra for FM coverage, they felt that there would be discrimination among advertisers if
some programs were duplicated while others were not. See Communications to the FCC
from American Broadcasting Co., Columbia Broadcasting Co., Mutual Broadcasting Sys-
tem, and National Broadcasting System, dated March, 1948, copies on file in the Yale Law
Library. Since that time the FCC has taken no further action to check this network practice.
As early as 1946 Commissioners Durr and Walker expressed some scepticism as to
statements by the networks that they felt FM would replace AM as the chief medium.
Edward J. Noble, 3 Pixn & FiSCHER RADIO REG. 449, 458 (1946). The Commission ap-
proved the sale to ABC of 5,000 watt, regional AM station, WXYZ of Detroit, for
$2,800,000, of which $2,155,000 represented "good will." At the same time ABC planned to
build at a cost of only $33,460, an FM station in Detroit which admittedly would provide
superior service over a wider area. In his dissenting opinion, Durr pointed out that ABC
[Vol. 60: 78
1951] IMPACT OF FCC'S CHAIN BROADCASTING RULES 101
have had no economic incentive to build FM stations I" and listeners have
been discouraged from purchasing FM receiving sets because they would
hear few, if any, new programs.1 1 2 Furthermore, because of the limited sale
of receivers, independent station owners have had difficulty attracting ad-
vertising for exclusively FM programs because those programs reach only a
small fraction of the potential audience. The net result is that network
affiliateg view their FM stations as financial drains, and successful operation
of an FM station unconnected with AM or network service is virtually im-
possible." 3 Hence FM itself is being squeezed out of existence." 4
would hardly be foolish enough to invest so large a sum in the "good will" of an AM station
if it expected that FM was soon to become the dominant medium. Id. at 460.
In 1948 Dr. Edwin H. Armstrong, inventor of FM, charged that RCA had purposely
obstructed the progress of FM. These charges touched off a series of inconclusive Congres-
sional hearings. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Commerce on Certain Charges
Involving Development of FMRadio and RCA Patent Policies, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948).
111. Another factor contributing to this result was the former requirement of the Amer-
ican Federation of Musicians that double the number of musicians be employed whenever
an instrumental musical program was to be released over AM and FM facilities under com-
mon operation. During 1946 and 1947, the years during which this requirement was en-
forced, live musical programs were effectively banned from most FM stations. See gen-
erally, Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on restrictive practices of the Amer-
ican Federation of Musicians-H.R. 111, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1948).
112. Radio manufacturers, in turn, have made little or no effort to push the sale of FM
receivers and have failed noticeably to come out with inexpensive sets. WARNER, RADIO
AND TELEvISION LAW 618 (1948).
113. These consequences were foreseen by Commissioners Durr and Walker. In thei
dissent in the Noble case, see note 110 supra, they allded to evidence that ABC planned
to follow a policy of complete duplication of programs. nd that it would not consider setting
up an FM station in competition with an AM affiliate. They then went on: "[tlo summarize
the tendency of such a course of action, if followed broadly in the broadcast industry: the
network AM affiliate will not be encouraged to establish an FM station because-at least
so far as network operations are concerned-he will receive no additional compensation
whatsoever for his FM operations in the earlier stages and will later receive only a slight
increase in rates to reimburse him for his out-of-pocket expenditures; the listener will not be
encouraged to buy receiving sets with FM bands because it will enable him to hear few, if
any, programs not available through his AM receiver; and the newcomer will be discouraged
from attempting to enter the field of broadcasting through the medium of FM because his
listening audience will be limited by the scarcity of FM receivers, he will have little hope of
a network affiliation, and he will not be able to compete for advertising revenue either with
the standard broadcaster who has a wider listening audience or with the broadcaster who
operated both AM and FM but offers both services for the price of one." Id. at 462.
114. The number of FM stations on the air is now actually declining. In September
1946, 65 commercial FM stations were in operation. This number rose to 278 in 1947, 619
in 1948, and 738 in 1949; but by November 1950 the peak had been passed and only 672
stations remained on the air. Broadcasting Magazine, Sept. 30, 1946, p. 71; Sept. 15, 1947,
p. 41; Sept. 20, 1948, p. 93; Sept. 26, 1949, p. 84; Nov. 20, 1950, p. 78. Furthermore, there
is almost a complete dearth of new applications to the FCC for FM licenses. In September
1950 there were 275 applications pending for AM stations as against 17 for FM. Broadcast-
ing Magazine, Sept. 25, 1950, p. 92. Finally, most FM stations presently licensed are op-
erating at a deficit. FCC, ANNuAL REPORT 40 (1949).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
TV
Television, on the other hand, is destined ultimately to supplant radio as
the primary medium of telecommunication. 1 5 But the promised expansion
is a long way off," 8 and the immediate prospect is one of an acute scarcity of
stations. At present 62 communities are served by television stations.
17
Only 40 of these communities are interconnected by coaxial cables or micro-
wave relay and hence available for simultaneous programming to the four
TV networks, American, Columbia, DuMont and National."8 Of the 40
interconnected markets, 37 have less than 4 stations."9 Since access to these
inadequately served markets is extremely important to the networks, TV
stations are at present in a superior bargaining position and, as a result,
typically have affiliation contracts with several networks.'
Despite multiple affiliation, however, today NBC occupies in television a
position of dominance far more complete than it ever enjoyed in standard
broadcasting. In a recent survey of 26 interconnected television communities
served by less than four stations, the FCC found that NBC accounted for
52.1% of the network programs distributed by all four networks.' 2' In one-
station markets, National's share was 65.8% while DuMont was limited to
3.8%.122 The most extreme example of monopoly coverage was Wilmington,
Delaware, where NBC supplied the only station with 274 of its 28Y4 hours
115. "In all probability, [television] will be the primary medium of communications to
the public during the peak listening hours .... The eventual displacement of aural broad-
casting by television during the peak listening hours is attributable to the inherent ad-
vantages of sight and sound compared to sound alone and the funneling of the bulk of
advertising appropriations into television." WARNEi RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 670
(1948).
116. The present scarcity of TV stations is due to a "freeze" on new applications im-
posed by the FCC in September 1948 because serious tropospheric interference had ap-
peared in many areas. FCC, ANNuAL REPORT 43 (1949); Statement of Chairman Coy before
an Industry-Commission Conference, September 13, 1948, I PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG.
91:91. It is highly doubtful that the freeze will be lifted before the spring of 1951. Even
after the FCC begins to accept new applications, construction of additional stations will
not begin until these applications have been processed, administrative hearings held, and,
in some cases, appeals to the courts decided. Long delays are most likely to occur in im-
portant metropolitan markets, because applications for licenses in these areas will surely
outnumber the allotted frequencies.
117. Broadcasting Magazine, Sept. 25, 1950, p. 76.
118. FCC, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING, Docket No. 9807, 1 (1950).
119. Ibid.
120. In its recent survey of 26 interconnected markets served by less than four stations,
see note 121 infra, the FCC found that 25 of the 41 stations surveyed were affiliated with
two or more networks. Of these 25 stations, 10 had contracts with all four networks, 5 with
three networks, and the other 10 with two networks. Id. Appendix Exhibits J, K (1950).
121. Id. Appendix Exhibits B, D, F (1950). The survey, which took place during the week
of May 14-20, 1950, covered 17 one-station markets, 3 two-station markets, and 6
three-station markets.
122. Id. Appendix Exhibit B.
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of network programs carried during the survey week. 123 In all likelihood
NBC's preeminence in TV is due chiefly to superior programming and sell-
ing initiative. DuMont, however, has complained to the FCC that it is
hampered by two artificial restraints. It contends, first, that NBC and,
to a lesser extent, CBS are able to exercise undue leverage on TV outlets
owned by their AM affiliates; 124 and, second, that the all-important but as
yet inadequate system of coaxial cables is apportioned so favorably to
National and Columbia that American and DuMont could not expand even
if they were able to clear time on additional stations.'25
Without passing on the merits of these contentions, the FCC is consider-
ing taking steps to remedy the extremely unbalanced competitive situation
which has developed. The Commission realizes that present patterns of
competition and standards of programming will shape the future of televi-
sion. 2 ' It fears that NBC's dominance, if allowed to continue, may so
stunt the growth of other networks that they will be incapable "of fulfilling
future needs when there are additional TV stations on the air." 11 There-
fore, the Commission has recently proposed adoption of a new regulation
limiting the number of hours which television stations may take from any
single network until a community is served by at least four stations.2 8
123. Id. Appendix Exhibit J. In the other 16 one-station communities, NBC provided
30.6 to 86.9% of the total network programs.
124. Broadcasting Magazine, Sept. 25, 1950, p. 69 and Oct. 2, 1950, p. 60. Dumont ex-
plained that NBC and CBS have been able to persuade some of these stations to accept
affiliation contracts under which no compensation is paid for as many as the first 30 hours
of network commercial programs each month. This is the standard provision for payment
for distribution expenses and network sustaining programs in AM broadcasting. The effect
of such a provision on a TV station, however, differs gr. itly from its effect on an AM station.
Since AM affiliates generally broadcast 18 hours a day and t ke programs from only one
network, they have no trouble building up enough network commercial time each month to
make their contracts profitable. TV stations, on the other hand, rarely telecast more than
200 hours a month and are typically affiliated with several networks from each of which they
presumably plan to take programs. But if they are to make any money at all from a National
or Columbia contract which pays nothing for the first 30 commercial hours, they must take
so many NBC or CBS programs that they have little or no time left for programs of other
networks.
125. The coaxial cable system is owned by the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany which leases use of the cables to the several networks for three-month periods. As yet
the system is still far too incomplete to accommodate all four networks at the same time,
and the shortage will not be eliminated for at least several years. Brief for National Associa.
tion of Radio Station Representatives, p. 33, Spot Sales Hearings (1949). For a report on
the progress A.T. & T. is making in its plans to provide nationwide coverage, see FCC,
ANNUAL REPORT 94 (1949). Under the allocation which A.T. & T. has made for the last
quarter of 1950, NBC and CBS are granted use of over 75% of the available cables during
the all-important evening hours. Broadcasting Magazine, October 2, 1950, p. 60.
On October 18, 1950, the FCC announced that it would start hearings on November 20
to investigate the allegations of unfairness in the current allocation of A.T. & T. facilities
and to formulate a basis for future allocations. FCC Release No. 56531, October 18, 1950.
126. FCC, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING, Docket 9087, 1 (1950).
127. Id. at 3.
128. The Commission's proposal, in greater detail, is for "a rule providing that with the
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ENFORCEMENT OF THE RULES
The Chain Broadcasting Rules have had little effect on network-affiliate
relations partially because of the Commission's weak enforcement policy.
Never has the FCC revoked or refused to renew a license of a network-
owned or affiliated station because of violation of the Rules. Only once has
it even held hearings on the question. In that instance a unanimous Com-
mission found that the Don Lee Broadcasting System had repeatedly in-
duced its affiliates to violate at least three of the Rules. " A majority of the
Commissioners, however, refused to invoke any sanctions against the net-
work."' Last year several stations owned by NBC and ABC were put on
exception of one five hour segment a week (to be chosen by the station), no station in a one-
station community shall carry the programs of any one network for more than two hours a
segment in either the afternoon or evening time segments, no station in a two-station com-
munity shall carry the programs of any one network for more than three hours within one
segment, and no station in a three-station community shall carry the programs of any one
network for more than four hours within one segment, such rule to be similar in form to Sec-
tion 3.634 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, the segments referred to being the
1:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. segments set forth in Section 3.634."
Id. at 4.
On one occasion the Commission has invoked the Chain Rules against a television net-
work. In the winter of 1949-50, NBC was promoting a 2Y2 hour Saturday night TV revue,
"Show of Shows." National originally offered the whole 2j-2 hours as a block without in-
forming affiliates of the exact nature of the programs to be included or the names of the
sponsors. This offer was extended to a number of outlets in one- and two-station towns,
whose acceptance would have precluded other networks from many Saturday night audi-
ences. Acceptance by affiliates was to be immediately binding on them, but binding on
NBC only if the offer were accepted by a sufficient number of stations to justify proceeding
with the show. Spurred by a complaint from DuI\ )nt, the Commission informed NBC that
this arrangement in effect created an exclusive option ovc these important hours and un-
reasonably impaired licensee responsibility. After the Commission had rejected a com-
promise plan, National backed down and offered the revue in half-hour segments with full
advance information as to program content and sponsorship. FCC, Public Notices 46462,
Feb. 16, 1950, and 51694, June 22, 1950.
129. 5 PiKE & FischER RADio REG. 1179 (1949). The Commission's decision came
down on December 28, 1949. The Rules in question were 3.101, 3.104, and 3.105. See
pages 96-8 supra.
130. Id. at 1200. The majority consisted of Commissioners Hyde, Sterling, Jones (con-
curring); Chairman Coy and Commissioner Hennock dissented; Commissioner Walker did
not participate.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority gave some weight to a promise of future good
conduct made by Lewis Allen Weiss, Don Lee's general manager, who had been chiefly
responsible for the network's past policies. Id. at 1200. His assurance would seem belated
and of doubtful reliability in view of his open declaration "that he did not believe in the
enforcement of the regulations which he felt were inconsistent with the economic interests of
Don Lee." Id. at 1199.
Commissioner Jones concurred in the majority decision because he felt that to do other-
wise would be discriminatory against Don Lee, in view of the fact that no hearings had been
designated on the licenses of other networks against whom comparable prima facie evidence
was at hand. It is interesting to note, however, that his was the swing vote in this test case,
which can now be used as precedent to thwart license reprisals against other networks. In
fact, the Commission itself suggested that the fate of NBC and ABC depended at least in
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temporary license because those netvorks were suspected of engaging in
similar practices. 3' But since that time the Commission has taken no
further steps.
This lack of enthusiasm for enforcement is traceable in some degree to
the harassed development of the Commission itself. The vagueness of the
Communications Act in outlining FCC authority 132 has subjected every
move to jurisdictional attack. 3 3 Congressional committees, critical of FCC
policy, have precipitated exhausting investigations tying up Commissioners
for as long as a year and a half at a time.3 4 Continuity of administration
part on the outcome of the Don Lee hearings. FCC, Public Notice 42574, pp. 3, 5 Oct. 31,
1949.
131. In the fall of 1949, action on the renewal of the licenses of 11 stations owned by
American, National, and Columbia was delayed pending decision in the spot sales hearings.
See pages 91-2 supra. The Commission also pointed out to ABC and NBC that it had
evidence indicating practices comparable to those involved in the Don Lee hearings. Ibid.
In 1950 the Commission decided that no violation of the Chain Rules had been shown in the
spot hearings and Columbia's licenses were renewed. FCC, Public Notice No. 52837, July 21,
1950. Stations licensed to National and American remain on temporary license, however,
pending disposition of other complaints still outstanding. Since temporary licensing, ;I-
volves no discomfort and is by no means a rare occurrence, this action has little meaning
in itself.
132. The touchstone of FCC regulation is the standard of "public interest, convenience,
and necessity" Communications Act §§ 303, 307(a), 309(a), 319(a).
133. E.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943) (promlgation by
Commission of Chain Broadcasting Rules regulating relationship between networks and
affiliates); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (refusal to consider
competitive effect on existing stations that would result from granting license to new sta-
tion); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. 309 U.S. 134 (1940) (refusal to give priority to
technically and financially qualified applicant whose original application was delayed by
judicial review when subsequent applicants seemed generally better qualified).
134. Resolutions to investigate the FCC were introduced in Congress in 1934, 1936,
1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, and 1942. SIEPMANN, RADIo's SECOND CHANCE, 213 (1947).
The investigation to end all investigations began on July 2, 1943, and lasted for 18 months.
Hearings Before House Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communications Committee
Pursuant to H. Res. 21, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). This inquisition was instigated and
initially chairmaned by Representative Cox, who seized the opportunity to vent his resent-
ment at being exposed by the Commission for illegally accepting a fee from a Georgia radio
station for services before the FCC. Wmm, THE AIMERICAN RADIO 202 (1947). Other
opportunities for Congressional criticism of Commission personnel and practices have oc-
curred, of course, at appropriation and confirmation of appointment hearings. See, e.g.,
Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on the Nomination of Thad H. Brown m
Reappointment as Federal Communications Commissioner, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940). See
generally, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: MONO-
GRAPH No. 3, 117-20 (1940); FRIEDRICH & STERNBERG, STUDIES IN THE CONTROL OF RADIO
797, 803-7 (1944); SIEPMANN, RADIO's SECOND CHANCE 212-38 (1947).
But Congressional criticism has been dwarfed by the torrents of invective hurled by the
broadcasting industry itself. See, e.g., testimony of Mark Ethridge, Louisville station
owner, in Hearings on S. Res. 113, pp. 321-46 (1941); Broadcasting Magazine, 1,lay 12,
1941, p. 18 (editorial). Despite severe criticism on the part of the industry, however, the
FCC has been accused of identifying itself with the special interests supposedly being policed
by it, and losing sight of the public interest. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF GOVERN-
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has been hampered by rapid turnover in Commission membership.135
But perhaps the main reason for the Commission's leniency in enforcing
the Rules is that the only available sanction is too harsh. In this situation
the statute provides but one enforcement device: withdrawing "I the licenses
of individual stations. 137 If the Commission were willing to use this weapon,
it should have no difficulty persuading the networks to comply with the
Rules, despite its lack of direct jurisdiction over them. Revocation or re-
fusal to renew the licenses of network-owned stations would fast bring the
networks to terms,"' for these stations account for a large portion of net-
work revenue. 139 But throughout its history the Commission has felt that
MENT: TAsK FORCE REPORT ON THE FCC 111-53 (1949) (edited by Golub). See also speech
on Senate floor by Senator Edwin C. Johnson, 95 CONG. REc. 4782 (1949).
135. Commissioners are appointed for seven-year terms, but only one Chairman has
lasted more than three years and the tenures of other Commissioners have been equally
brief. See Hearings before House Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communications
Commission pursuant to H. Res. 21, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1577-8 (1943); COmtIIssIoN ON
ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT: APPENDIX N 40, 94 (1949).
136. As used in this comment, the term "withdrawal" includes both (1) revocation of
a'l!,cense under § 312 of the Communications Act and (2) refusal to renew a license under
§ 369.
117. Communications Act § 309. The Act provides other enforcement devices: § 401(a)
gives district courts power to issue writs of mandamus commanding persons to comply with
the Act's provisions; § 401(b) gives the FCC authority to apply to a district court for an
enforcement order whenever any person has failed to obey a Commission order; § 501 makes
wilful violation of the Act a criminal offense punishable by fine and imprisonment; and
§ 502 makes wilful violation of "any rule, regulation, restriction, or condition made or im-
posed by the Commission under authority of the Act a criminal offense punishable by a
fine of S500 per day." None of these provisions apply to a licensee's "violation" of the Chain
Broadcasting Rules, however, because the Rules, by their very terms, do not order a licensee
to do or refrain from doing anything. but simply define the policies which the Commission
itself will follow in the exercise of its licensing power. See page 84 supra.
138. The licenses of network-owned stations could be withdrawn even though these
stations had not themselves entered into any of the proscribed arrangements. This was the
situation in the Don Lee Case, 5 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 1179, 1198 (1949). "The
Commission can and does consider the qualifications of the networks in passing upon ap-
plications for renewal of license of their stations. And the Commission would be warranted
in refusing a renewal of license on the ground of lack of qualifications if a network compelled
its affiliates to violate the network regulations." Communication to Honorable Edwin C.
Johnson, Chairman, Interstate Commerce Committee from the FCC, February 15, 1949, 1
PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 91-13 1.
For judicial affirmance of Commission's discretion in weighing character qualifications of
licensees, see Mester v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 118 (E.D. N.Y. 1947), aff'd, 332 U.S.
749 (1947) (application for transfer of control denied in part because of violations of Pure
Food and Drug Act and Price Control Act); FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946) (renewal
denied because of misrepresentation of financial control).
139. The networks do not publish financial reports indicating what portion of their in-
come stems from station ownership. However, Charles Denny, former Chairman of the FCC
and piesently executive secretary of NBC, made the following statement in response to a
proposal that network ownership of stations be curtailed: "IT]he economics of network
broadcasting are such that if we are to have network broadcasting as we know it today [the
networks] . . . have to have enough stations in order financially to support a network.
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imposition of a death sentence on stations is too drastic a step. 140 For many
years this policy was justified in terms of a refusal to deprive listeners of
service. 14' Inferior stations were considered better than none. But the
promptness with which the vacated franchises would be snapped up today
has made this reasoning inapposite.14 2 Today the Commission's policy
seems to be based simply upon the notion that the sudden termination of a
licensee's operations is too blunt an instrument. In the Don Lee case, for
example, withdrawal of licenses would have ended the service of four sta-
tions. "'43 But the FCC's reluctance to use its statutory weapon means that
its "raised eyebrow" techniques-temporary licenses, letters of interpreta-
tion, warnings, and the like 144-are becoming increasingly ineffective be-
cause the networks do not fear that more drastic action will follow.
As long as the Commission persists in this policy, some new intermediate
They do not make money on their network operations. They lose money on those. Where
they make money is from the management of the stations that they own." Hearings before
Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1947).
140. The FCC has refused to revoke licenses even after finding a clear violation of the
Communications Act. The Florida Cases, 9 F.C.C. 208, 223 (1942) (misrepresentation in
application for license-violation of § 312(a) ); The Texas Cases, 8 F.C.C. 445, 459, 473,
479 (1940) (misrepresentation in transfer of licenses-violation of § 310(b) ). Similar re-
luctance has been shown in renewal proceedings. Don Lee Broadcasting System, 5 PIKE
& FISCHER RADIO REG. 1179 (1949) (violation of Chain Broadcasting Regulations); Hiawa-
thaland Broadcasting Co., 3 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 44 (1945) (engineering violations
and failure to file financial reports); First Baptist Church, 6 F.C.C. 771 (1939) (rebroadcast-
ing without permission of originating station-violation of § 325(a) ); Joseph C. Callay, 5
F.C.C. 345 (1938) (misrepresentation in transfer of license-violation of § 310(b) ).
141. In declining to revoke the licenses of five Texas stations which had been found
guilty of gross misrepresentation of facts concerning ownership and control, the Commission
rationalized its decision on this ground: "Moreover we are faced with the circumstance
that in none of the areas wherein these stations are located, excluding Austin, Tex., is there
any other station to serve as a medium for community expression excepting said stations."
Red Lands Broadcasting Association et al., 8 F.C.C. 473,474-5 (1941).
142. See note 57 supra. Commissioner Payne, dissenting in The Texas Cases, supra note
140, said: "The Commission seems to be much worried about leaving certain areas in Texas
'without broadcasting service, if these revocation orders were affirmed. This, in my opinion,
is an unnecessary worry. It has been my experience that new stations spring up quickly
without coaxing and without the need of sending out engraved invitations." East Texas
Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 479,484 (1941).
143. Stations KGB, San Diego; KDB, Santa Barbara; KRFC, San Francisco; and
KHJ and KHJ-FM, Los Angeles. Don Lee Broadcasting System, 5 PiRE & FISCHER RADIO
REG. 1179 (1949).
144. The Commission has at times used these devices to point out to the networks
possible violations of its rules and regulations. In a letter which it sent to the networks in
March, 1948, for example, the Commission expressed its belief that the networks' insistence
that affiliates duplicate all network programs over their FM stations, involved a violation
of Chain Broadcasting Regulation 3.235. But the FCC has made no further effort to check
this network practice. See note 110 supra. The Commission also used the interpretive letter
device to eliminate restrictive features from NBC's promotion of its 2' 2 hour Saturday night
television revue, "Show of Shows." In that instance NBC obeyed the FCC's warning and
modified its offers to affiliates so as to comply with the Chain Rules. See note 128 supra
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sanction must be authorized if the Rules are to have any force. The Com-
mission itself has indicated that some lesser penalty would be used without
hesitation. 145 Perhaps the most effective step that could be taken would
be to amend the Communications Act so as to give the Commission power
to issue cease and desist orders. 4 These orders, if not complied with,
should be enforceable by the courts in the same manner as the orders of the
N.L.R.B. 4 7 Explicit authorization to issue cease and desist orders against
networks as well as licensees would obviate the necessity of the present in-
direct enforcement procedure. 148 Other proposals that have been made for
amending the Act would empower the Commission to levy fines and suspend
licenses for a limited period of time.'49 The fine and suspension devices
would avoid the difficulties and delays of proving initial violations at a Com-
mission hearing and subsequent violations in a contempt proceeding, before
the actual imposition of any real penalty. Congressional approval of ad-
ministrative fines is doubtful,' however, and license suspension is subject
145. The majority of the Commission stated in the Don Lee decision: "Had we authority
to order a suspension, assess a penalty or impose some other sanction less than a 'death
sentence' we should have no hesitancy whatsoever in doing so in this case." Don Lee Broad-
casting System, 5 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO PEG. 1179, 1200 (1949).
146. Several bills that would give the Commission this power have been introduced in
Congress in recent years. S. 1333, Sec. 14(b), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. 1973, Sec.
11(b), 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.R. 6949 and H.R. 7310, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1950).
S. 1973, which passed the Senate in August, 1949, and was then referred to the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, is still pending. 95 CONG. REc. 11090, 11233
(1949).
At the hearings on all these bills, the cease and desist provision was favorably received
by the Commission and broadcasters alike. See, e.g., Hearings before Committee on Interstate
Commerce on S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 51, 82 (1947); Hearings before Committee on In-
terstate Commerce on S. 1973, 81st Cong., lst Sess. 20, 52, 101 (1949).
147. None of the bills referred to in note 146 supra makes specific provision for court
enforcement of the cease and desist orders which the FCC would be empowered to issue.
Presumably § 401 of the Communications Act would apply to such orders, however. That
section provides that if any person fails to obey any FCC order, the Commission may apply
to a district court for enforcement; and if the court, after hearing, determines that the order
"was regularly made and duly served, and that the person is in disobedience of the same,"
it shall enforce obedience to the order. This section is deficient in several respects. For one
thing, it requires that the FCC wait until its own order has been violated before it can seek
a court order enforcing it. The NLRB, by contrast, can petition a court of appeals for an
enforcement order as soon as it has issued its own order. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 61
STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160e (Supp. 1949). Furthermore, § 401 of the Communica-
tions Act is far from explicit in stating just what review the district court is to accord an
FCC order. The Taft-Hartley Act, on the other hand, provides that "the findings of the
(N.L.R.B.) with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole shall be conclusive" and that the court may enter a decree
"enforcing, modifying, . . . or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board."
Ibid.
148. H.R. 7310, supra note 146, contained such a provision.
149. See, e.g., H.R. 6949 and H.R. 7310, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1950) (suspension for a
period not to exceed 90 days and/or fine of $500 for each day of violation).
150. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 322-39 (1947).
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to the objection that it penalizes the listening public as well as the trans-
gressing station. 5 '
CONCLUSION
Revamping the Rules is particularly vital because the networks seem to
be safe from both government and private suits under the antitrust laws.
In 1941 the Justice Department filed an indictment against NBC and CBS,
alleging extensive violations of the Sherman Act.1 5 2 As soon as the Supreme
Court upheld the FCC's authority to issue the Rules, however, the Justice
Department withdrew its indictment because it considered the question as
moot.1 3 The networks have been equally immune from treble damage suits.
A treble damage action was instituted in 1947,114 alleging that network prac-
tices excluded independent stations from the national advertising market
and that network power to set station rates for network commercial pro-
grams amounted to illegal price fixing. In denying preliminary injunctive
relief, the Second Circuit implied that it would be improper for a court to
condemn these practices which are tacitly condoned by the FCC.'55 Hence
the networks seem safe in assuming that the supervision of the Commission
will protect them from interference by the courts under the antitrust laws.
Many of the problems of competitive inequality at both network and
station levels could be solved by a change in the Commission's station
allocation policies. The most effective, but at the same time most drastic,
step would be to set a deadline before which all AM stations except clear
151. If a license were merely suspended, it is unlikely that anybody else would take over
the franchise during the suspension period because of the limited tenure. As a result, the
public would be deprived of programs during that time.
152. United States v. CBS, Civil Docket 3762 and United States v. R.C.A., Civil Docket
3763 (filed in the District Court of the Northern District of Illinois, December 31, 1941).
6 JoURAL OF THE FEDERAL CoumuNcAT16NS BAR ASSOCIATION 85 (1942). The allegations
in the Justice Department's indictment closely paralleled the findings of the Chain Broad-
casting Report.
153. CCH, FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS 268 (1949).
154. Federal Broadcasting System v. American Broadcasting Co., 167 F.2d 349 (2nd
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 821 (1948). See note 59 supra.
The only other treble damage suit ever brought against the networks was one instituted
by Mutual on January 10, 1942, against RCA and NBC. ROBINsoN, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 74. This action was dropped when the Chain Broadcasting Rules were affirmed.
155. Federal Broadcasting System v. American Broadcasting Co., 167 F.2d 349, 352
(2nd Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 821 (1948). The FCC felt that this decision "re-
flect[ed] a serious misapprehension as to the intent and scope of the Commission Chain
Broadcasting Regulations." Quoted in Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 4,
Federal Broadcasting System v. American Broadcasting Co. In response to the Commis-
sion's suggestion, the Government filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff's petition
to the Supreme Court for certiorari. In that brief the Government pointed out that the FCC
had not intended to sanction any practices which might otherwise be violative of the anti-
trust laws, and that the Commission had neither the power nor the desire to supersede the
Justice Department or private treble damage litigants in the enforcement of those laws.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Federal Broadcasting System v. American Broad-
casting Co., 335 U.S. 821 (1948).
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channel stations serving primarily rural areas must convert to FM. Ob-
viously such a change-over would entail great expense not only to station
owners 156 but also to listeners who would be forced to purchase FM re-
ceivers. Much of this waste could have been avoided by a foresighted FCC
in 1945 when there were far fewer AM stations 157 and many prewar receiv-
ing sets were in need of replacement. 155 Perhaps 1950 is a bad time to force
such a change in view of the uncertainty as to the full economic effects of
television.'59 But if the Commission waits another 10 years until adjust-
ments have been made to reflect the influence of TV, this will probably
mean the sacrifice of the 700 odd FM stations which are now sttuggling for
existence. In any event, since the possibility of a dominant FM system
declines with the construction of each new AM station and the purchase of
each new AM receiver, the time for Commission action, if action is ever to
be taken, is now.
Short of ordering a shift to FM, the Commission could replace those high-
powered clear channel stations which are located in densely populated areas,
and hence are neither designed nor needed to serve rural listeners, with
5,000-watt regional stations.10 In the essentially metropolitan northeastern
section of the country there are 12 Class I-A and 13 Class I-B clear channel
stations, most of them affiliated with NBC and CBS. 6' If these clear chan-
156. The cost of the FM equipment itself would not be prohibitive to more profitable
AM stations, but conversion might well be too expensive for those postwar licensees who are
just beginning to make ends meet. Estimates of costs made by the FCC in 1945 ranged
from $8,000 for a 250-watt FM station to $79,050 for one with 50,000 watts. SENATE COM-
MITTEE TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF SMALL BUSINESS, SMsALL BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN FM
BROADCASTING 9, 15-17 (1946). No doubt licensees of powerful AM stations would object
strenuously to the loss of their AM franchises, especially if they paid heavily for "good will"
or prestige. See note 110 supra. Since the Communications Act expressly negatives any
vested right to operate a station beyond the term of the license, § 309(b) (1), these objec-
tions would have no basis in law.
157. From 1945 to 1949, the number of AM licenses has risen from 931 to 1,963. FCC,
ANNUAL REPORT 30 (1949).
158. As of January 1, 1946, an estimated 58,000,000 AM sets were in use. By March 31,
1950, another 46,665,364 AM-only sets had been produced. Statistics collected by the FCC
from reports submitted by Radio Manufacturers Association, on file in Yale Law Library.
It is impossible to say how many of these forty-six million sets were replacements, but the
percentage is probably high.
159. For prediction that aural broadcasting will soon be relegated to a relatively minor
role, see WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 670-1 (1948). Hugh Beville, NBC's di-
rector of research, presents a more optimistic view for aural broadcasting. 25 JOURNALISM
QUARTERLY 3-9 (1948).
160. There has already been considerable agitation in favor of this type of action by the
Commission. In 1948 a bill was introduced by Senator Johnson of Colorado providing for
the licensing of additional stations for full-time operation on frequencies which are at present
clear channel. 94 CONG. REc. 1727 (1948). But the bill, which was opposed by the Clear
Channel Broadcasting Services (a trade association), was never reported out of committee.
Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2231, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948).
161. Of these 25 stations, 8 are located in New York state, 5 in Chicago, 3 in Pennsyl-
vania, 3 in Ohio, and one each in Baltimore, Boston, Detroit, Ft. Wayne, Hartford, and
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nel frequencies were redesignated as regional channels, at least 200 new
regional outlets could be licensed in addition to those needed to replace the
deleted stations.1 2 This action would lessen the competitive advantage of
NBC and CBS in the profitable northeastern market and would put all the
stations in that area on a far more equal footing.
But if the Commission is unwilling to take either of these steps, there are
several less ambitious measures which it should take in an effort to breathe
new life into the Chain Rules.
In order to reduce the inequality of competition at the station level, the
FCC should:
a) require the networks to provide a uniform and convenient mechanism
by which independent stations can obtain, with assurance of reasonable
tenure, network programs rejected by an affiliate;
b) restrict network representation of stations in the spot market to sta-
tions actually owned and operated by the network.
As long as networks exist, affiliates will probably have a competitive ad-
vantage over independents. But adoption of these proposals would temper
the competitive disparity, without unduly hindering efficient network
operations.
To promote competition among networks, the FCC should:
a) favor American and Mutual affiliates whenever applications for in-
creased power are made; and
b) adopt, as quickly as possible, its proposed rule to limit the number of
hours which TV stations may take from any single network until a com-
munity is served by at least four stations.
The task of safeguarding licensee independence is largely one of enforce-
ment. In order to strengthen the Commission's enforcement policy, Con-
gress should:
a) arm the FCC with intermediate sanctions; and
b) give the Commission jurisdiction over the networks to enable it to take
direct action against any network which violates the Rules.
Finally, the most effective step that could be taken to revitalize the Rules
would be a change of attitude on the part of the FCC. Until the Commission
demonstrates that it will punish networks which unduly coerce their affil-
iates, and licensees who disregard their public service responsibilities, the
Network Rules will never cut their baby teeth, much less their six-year
molars.
Washington, D. C. NBC and CBS control sixteen, either through outright ownership or
affiliation contracts, ABC and Mutual control six, and the remaining three are independent.
BROADCASTING MAGAZINE YEARBOOK 69-325 (1950).
162. An average of 20 regional stations can be allocated to each regional channel. Hence
about 240 stations could be licensed on the frequencies vacated by the 12 Class I-A north-
eastern stations. The 13 Class I-B channels could not be opened up to regional stations,
however, without causing interference with the remaining Class I-B stations on each of these
channels. Vacancies on I-B channels could be filled by licensing new I-B stations or by
elevating remaining I-B stations to Class I-A stations in areas where wider rural coverage is
needed.
